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140122 ||| eng |
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|a 9783642969782
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| 100 |
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|a Damme, Eric van
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| 245 |
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|a Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria
|h Elektronische Ressource
|c by Eric van Damme
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| 250 |
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|a 1st ed. 1987
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| 260 |
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|a Berlin, Heidelberg
|b Springer Berlin Heidelberg
|c 1987, 1987
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| 300 |
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|a XVII, 318 p. 1 illus
|b online resource
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|a 5.6 Strictly Proper Equilibria and Regular Equilibria -- 5.7 Proofs of the Theorems of Sect. 5.5 -- 6 Extensive Form Games -- 6.1 Definitions -- 6.2 Equilibria and Subgame Perfectness -- 6.3 Sequential Equilibria -- 6.4 Perfect Equilibria -- 6.5 Proper Equilibria -- 6.6 Control Costs -- 6.7 Incomplete Information -- 7 Bargaining and Fair Division -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Divide and Choose -- 7.3 Auction Methods -- 7.4 Bargaining Problems and Bargaining Solutions -- 7.5 The Nash Negotiation Game -- 7.6 The Rubinstein/Binmore Model -- 7.7 The Crawford/Moulin Model -- 7.8 Bargaining Games with Variable Threat Point -- 8 Repeated Games -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Preliminaries -- 8.3 Infinitely Repeated Games Without Discounting -- 8.4 Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting: Nash Equilibria -- 8.5 Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting: Subgame Perfect Equilibria -- 8.6Finitely Repeated Games: Nash Equilibria -- 8.7 Finitely Repeated Games: Subgame Perfect Equilibria --
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|a 8.8 Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria -- 9 Evolutionary Game Theory -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 Evolutionarily Stable Strategies -- 9.3 Strategic Stability of ESS -- 9.4 Population Dynamics -- 9.5 Asymmetric Contests: Examples and the Model -- 9.6 Asymmetric Contests: Results -- 9.7 Contests in Extensive Form: Definitions -- 9.8 Contests in Extensive Form: Results -- 10 Strategic Stability and Applications -- 10.1 Equivalence of Games -- 10.2 Requirements for Strategic Stability -- 10.3 Stable Equilibria -- 10.4 Signalling Games: Introduction -- 10.5 Signalling Games: Dominance, Intuitive Arguments and Stability. -- 10.6 Spence’s Job Market Signalling Model -- 10.7 The Chain Store Paradox -- 10.8 Repeated Games -- References -- Survey Diagrams
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|a 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Informal Description of Games and Game Theory -- 1.2 Dynamic Programming -- 1.3 Subgame Perfect Equilibria -- 1.4 Sequential Equilibria and Perfect Equilibria -- 1.5 Perfect, Proper and Persistent Equilibria -- 1.6 Essential Equilibria and Regular Equilibria -- 2 Games in Normal Form -- 2.1 Preliminaries -- 2.2 Perfect Equilibria -- 2.3 Proper Equilibria -- 2.4 Essential Equilibria -- 2.5 Regular Equilibria -- 2.6 An “Almost all” Theorem -- 3 Matrix and Bimatrix Games -- 3.1 Preliminaries -- 3.2 Perfect Equilibria -- 3.3 Regular Equilibria -- 3.4 Characterizations of Regular Equilibria -- 3.5 Matrix Games -- 4 Control Costs -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Games with Control Costs -- 4.3 Approachable Equilibria -- 4.4 Proper Equilibria -- 4.5 Perfect Equilibria -- 4.6 Regular Equilibria -- 5 Incomplete Information -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Disturbed Games -- 5.3 Firm Equilibria -- 5.4 Perfect Equilibria -- 5 Weakly Proper Equilibria --
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| 653 |
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|a Quantitative Economics
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| 653 |
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|a Econometrics
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| 041 |
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|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b SBA
|a Springer Book Archives -2004
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| 028 |
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|a 10.1007/978-3-642-96978-2
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| 856 |
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|u https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-96978-2?nosfx=y
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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|a 330.9
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| 520 |
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|a The last decade has seen a steady increase in the application of concepts from noncooperative game theory to such diverse fields as economics, political science, law, operations research, biology and social psychology. As a byproduct of this increased activity, there has been a growing awareness of the fact that the basic noncooperative solution concept, that of Nash equilibrium, suffers from severe drawbacks. The two main shortcomings of this concept are the following: (i) In extensive form games, a Nash strategy may prescribe off the equilibrium path behavior that is manifestly irrational. (Specifically, Nash equilibria may involve incredible threats), (ii) Nash equilibria need not be robust with respect to small perturbations in the data of the game. Confronted with the growing evidence to the detriment of the Nash concept, game theorists were prompted to search for more refined equilibrium notions with better properties and they have come up with a wide array of alternative solution concepts. This book surveys the most important refinements that have been introduced. Its objectives are fourfold (i) to illustrate desirable properties as well as drawbacks of the various equilibrium notions by means of simple specific examples, (ii) to study the relationships between the various refinements, (iii) to derive simplifying characterizations, and (iv) to discuss the plausibility of the assumptions underlying the concepts
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