Understanding Strategic Interaction Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten
Strategic interaction occurs whenever it depends on others what one finally obtains: on markets, in firms, in politics etc. Game theorists analyse such interaction normatively, using numerous different methods. The rationalistic approach assumes perfect rationality whereas behavioral theories take i...
| Other Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Berlin, Heidelberg
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
1997, 1997
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| Edition: | 1st ed. 1997 |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
| Collection: | Springer Book Archives -2004 - Collection details see MPG.ReNa |
Table of Contents:
- Communication Effort in Teams and in Games
- Endogenous Agendas in Committees
- The Organization of Social Cooperation: A Noncooperative Approach
- Reinhard Selten Meets the Classics
- Equlibrium Selection in Linguistic Games: Kial Ni (Ne) Parolas Esperanton?
- Relating Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Game Theory
- Are Stable Demands Vectors in the Core of Two-Sided Markets? Some Graph-Theoretical Considerations
- The Consistent Solution for Non-Atomic Games
- Finite Convergence of the Core in a Piecewise Linear Market Game
- Credible Threats of Secession, Partnership, and Commonwealths
- Principles in Behavioral Economics
- Rules for Experimenting in Psychology and Economics, and Why They Differ
- Reciprocity: The Behavioral Foundations of Socio-Economic Games
- Adaption of Aspiration Levels - Theory and Experiment
- A Model of Boundedly RationalExperienced Bargaining in Characteristic Function Games
- Theory, Field, and Laboratory: The Continuing Dialogue
- Interview with Elisabeth and Reinhard Selten
- On the State of the Art in Game Theory: An Interview with Robert Aumann
- Working with Reinhard Selten Some Recollections on Our Joint Work 1965–88
- and Survey
- Conceptual Ideas in Game Theory
- A Note on Imperfect Recall
- Futures Market Contracting When You Don’t Know Who the Optimists Are
- Games of Incomplete Information: The Inconsistent Case
- Admissibility and Stability
- Equilibrium Selection in Team Games
- Sustainable Equilibria in Culturally Familiar Games
- Evolutionary Game Theory
- Evolutionary Conflict and the Design of Life
- Evolutionary Selection Dynamics and Irrational Survivors
- Strict and Symmetric Correlated Equilibria are the Distributions of the ESS’s of Biological Conflicts with Asymmetric Roles
- Applications of Non-Cooperative Game Theory
- Recurring Bullies, Trembling and Learning
- Dumb Bugs vs. Bright Noncooperative Players: A Comparison
- Experimental Studies
- Naive Strategies in Competitive Games
- Induction vs. Deterrence in the Chain Store Game: How Many Potential Entrants are Needed to Deter Entry
- Cooperation in Intergroup and Single-Group Prisoner’s Dilemma Games
- On Styles of Relating to Bargaining Partners
- What Makes Markets Predict Well? Evidence from the Iowa Electronic Markets
- Sequencing and the Size of the Budget: Experimental Evidence
- Intertemporal Speculation under Uncertain Future Demand: Experimental Results
- Endowment Effect for Risky Assets
- List of Contributors