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The Stability Concept of Evolutionary Game Theory A Dynamic Approach

These Notes grew from my research in evolutionary biology, specifically on the theory of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS theory), over the past ten years. Personally, evolutionary game theory has given me the opportunity to transfer my enthusiasm for abstract mathematics to more practical purs...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Cressman, Ross
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Berlin, Heidelberg Springer Berlin Heidelberg 1992, 1992
Edition:1st ed. 1992
Series:Lecture Notes in Biomathematics
Subjects:
Mathematical And Computational Biology
Biostatistics
Biomathematics
Quantitative Economics
Ecology 
Econometrics
Ecology
Biometry
Online Access:
Collection: Springer Book Archives -2004 - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
Table of Contents:
  • 2. Single-Locus Models
  • 3. Two-Phenotype, Frequency-Dependent Evolution at a Single Locus
  • 4. Multi-Phenotype, Frequency-Dependent Evolution at a Single Locus
  • 5. A Two-Locus, Two-Allele, Two-Phenotype Example
  • 5. Frequency- and Density-Dependent Evolution in a Haploid Species
  • 1. Frequency- and Density-Dependent Fitness (and the Haploid Dynamic)
  • 2. Monomorphic DDESS’s and Stability
  • 3. The Density-Dependent Hawk-Dove Game
  • 4. The DDESS Conditions and Strong Stability
  • 5. Density-Dependent Natural Selection as a Haploid Evolutionary Game
  • 6. Evolutionary Stability in Multi-Species Population-Dynamic Models
  • An Intermission
  • 6. Evolutionary Stable Sets and Contestant Information
  • 1. A Mixed-Strategy Hawk-Dove Game
  • 2. The Static Characterization of an ES Set
  • 3. The Dynamic Characterization of an ES Set
  • 4.The Hawk-Dove Game with Varying Resource
  • 5. ES Sets for Games in Extensive Form
  • 6. The Owner-Intruder Game
  • 7. Multi-Stage Games
  • 7. References
  • 8. Index
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Frequency-Dependent Evolution in a Single Haploid Species
  • 1. Pure and Mixed Strategies
  • 2. Monomorphic ESS’s and Stability
  • 3. The Hawk-Dove Game
  • 4. The Static Characterization of an ESS
  • 5. Stability for the Continuous Dynamic
  • 6. The Strong Stability Concept and the Dynamic Characterization of an ESS
  • 7. Stability for the Discrete Dynamic
  • 8. Alternative Proof of Theorem 2.5.2
  • 9. Nonlinear Fitness Functions
  • 10. Appendix on Centre Manifold Theory
  • 3. Frequency-Dependent Evolution in a Two-Species Haploid System
  • 1. Frequency-Dependent Fitness
  • 2. Monomorphic ESS’s and Stability
  • 3. Examples: Battle-of-the-Sexes and Edgeworth Market Games
  • 4. The Static Characterization of a Two-Species ESS
  • 5. Strong Stability for the Continuous Dynamic
  • 6. Multi-Species Frequency-Dependent Evolution
  • 4. Frequency-Dependent Evolution in a Randomly-Mating Diploid Species
  • 1. Natural Selection as an Evolutionary Game

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