Credit Markets with Asymmetric Information
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Berlin, Heidelberg
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
1986, 1986
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| Edition: | 1st ed. 1986 |
| Series: | Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
| Collection: | Springer Book Archives -2004 - Collection details see MPG.ReNa |
Table of Contents:
- Ch. 0: Introduction and General Overview
- 0.1 Subject and Scope
- 0.2 Summary of Contents
- Ch. 1: Approaches to Equilibrium Credit Rationing
- 1.1 A General Description of a Credit Market
- 1.2 Definition of Credit Rationing
- 1.3 Borrowers With Different Wealth Endowments
- 1.4 The Role of the Horizontal Integration of the Banking Firm
- 1.5 Implicit Contracts and Credit Rationing
- 1.6 Concluding Remarks
- Ch. 2: Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, and Credit Rationing
- 2.1 The Basic Model
- 2.2 Projects of Different Riskiness
- 2.3 Borrowers of Different Honesty
- 2.4 Borrowers With Different Abilities
- 2.5 Unobservable Effort of Borrowers
- 2.6 Concluding Remarks
- Ch. 3: Credit Rationing in Multi-Period Models
- 3.1 Overview
- 3.2 Rationing as an Incentive Device
- 3.3 Experience Rating of Borrowers
- 3.4 Rationing With Endogenous Costs of Default
- 3.5 Bankruptcy as a Joint Decision of Bank and Borrower
- 3.6 Concluding Remarks
- Ch. 4: Screening vs. Rationing. The Role of Collateral
- 4.1 Overview
- 4.2 Projects of Different Riskiness
- 4.3 The Jaffee and Russell Model
- 4.4 Borrowers With Different Abilities
- 4.5 Borrowers With Unobservable Effort
- 4.6 Concluding Remarks
- Ch. 5: Loan Markets With Perfectly Divisible Projects
- 5.1 Overview
- 5.2 A Loan Market With Certain Returns
- 5.3 A Loan Market With Uncertain Returns
- 5.4 The Nash-Equilibrium With Borrowers of Different Abilities
- Ch. 6: Variable Loan Size, Signalling and Endogenous Information
- 6.1 Overview
- 6.2 Success-Failure Projects and Different Abilities
- 6.3 Strategic Stability of Credit Market Equilibria
- 6.4 Projects of Different Riskiness
- 6.5 Borrowers With Different Default Costs
- 6.6 Exchange of Information Between Banks
- 6.7 Concluding Remarks 173 Appendix
- Ch. 7: Variable LoanSize and Type II Rationing
- 7.1 Overview
- 7.2 The Basic Model
- 7.3 Loan Applicants With Different Default Costs
- 7.4 Loan Applicants With Different Abilities
- 7.5 Projects of Different Riskiness
- 7.6 The Role of Effort
- 7.7 Concluding Remarks
- Ch. 8: Epilogue: Whither Now