| Summary: | Over the past few decades two different corporate governance systems have evolved. Countries with an "insider system" exhibit a high level of ownership concentration, illiquid capital markets, and a high level of crossholdings. Countries with an "outsider system" are characterized by widely dispersed ownership, liquid stock markets, a low level of inter-corporate crossholdings, and an active market for corporate control. Markus Berndt explains the observable differences by elaborating on the influence of network effects on corporate governance systems. He develops a coherent theoretical framework pulling together existing agency theories and providing new theoretical foundations wherever there is a gap. The presented theory gives answers to the following questions: How does the insider system of corporate governance function despite its inefficiencies? Why do we not see any significant convergence of ownership structures and regulations? What are the legislative requirements in the different systems? How does globalization affect the effectiveness of the institutional arrangements? Which system should be chosen by developing countries?
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