|
|
|
|
| LEADER |
06075nmm a2200409 u 4500 |
| 001 |
EB000629333 |
| 003 |
EBX01000000000000000482415 |
| 005 |
00000000000000.0 |
| 007 |
cr||||||||||||||||||||| |
| 008 |
140122 ||| eng |
| 020 |
|
|
|a 9781468457421
|
| 100 |
1 |
|
|a Garrity, Patrick J.
|e [editor]
|
| 245 |
0 |
0 |
|a Nuclear Weapons in the Changing World
|h Elektronische Ressource
|b Perspectives from Europe, Asia, and North America
|c edited by Patrick J. Garrity, Steven A. Maaranen
|
| 250 |
|
|
|a 1st ed. 1992
|
| 260 |
|
|
|a New York, NY
|b Springer US
|c 1992, 1992
|
| 300 |
|
|
|a 304 p
|b online resource
|
| 505 |
0 |
|
|a 12. Security after the Revolutions of 1989 and 1991: The Future with Nuclear Weapons -- Traditional Thoughts -- Challenges -- Nuclear Weapons, Power, and Ideas: A Hypothesis -- The Future of Nuclear Weapons: Problems Solved and Unsolved -- Conclusion -- 13. Building Peace under the Nuclear Sword of Damocles -- Pseudo-Dilemmas of Nuclear Deterrence -- Real Risks, Costs, and Limits of Nuclear Deterrence -- Managing Nuclear Deterrence -- 14. The Nuclear Future -- About the Authors
|
| 505 |
0 |
|
|a Issues for Analysis -- A Final Word -- 1. Nuclear Weapons, the End of the Cold War, and the Future of the International System -- 2. Nuclear Weapons in the 1990s and Beyond -- The United States -- The Former Soviet Union -- Europe and Japan -- China -- The Third World -- Conclusion -- 3. The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in a Restructured World -- The Relevant Threat: Soviet Relapse -- Priorities -- Characteristics of Future Nuclear Forces -- Third-Country Nuclear Forces -- A Program for Future Forces and Negotiations -- 4. The Deterrent Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States -- The Doctrine of Deterrence -- Minimal Deterrence as a Realistic Ideal of Coexistence in the Foreseeable Future -- The Main Parameters of a Minimal Nuclear Deterrence -- Is It Possible to Go Beyond Deterrence? -- 5. A Russian Perspective on the Future of Nuclear Weapons -- The New International Order -- Nuclear Weapons in the Former Soviet Union -- Nuclear Weapons and the New Military Doctrine --
|
| 505 |
0 |
|
|a U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in the East Asia/Western Pacific Region in the Coming Decade -- A U.S. Strategic Nuclear Posture for Extended Nuclear Deterrence in the Coming Decade -- Japan’s Nuclear Security: Is There an Alternative to the U.S. Umbrella? -- Conclusion -- 10. The Future of Nuclear Weapons: A Chinese Perspective -- The Declining Role of Nuclear Weapons -- The Passive Importance of Nuclear Weapons -- Maintaining Major-Power Status -- Technological Directions of Nuclear-Weapon Development -- The Impact of Nuclear Proliferation into the 1990s -- The Future of Nuclear Deterrence -- Conclusion -- 11. The Future of Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation in South Asia -- Proliferation Trends in South Asia -- Indo-Pakistani Relations -- Controlling Proliferation in South Asia -- U.S. Nonproliferation Policy in South Asia -- Regional Nonproliferation Proposals -- Global Nonproliferation Proposals -- Conclusion --
|
| 505 |
0 |
|
|a The Future of Nuclear Disarmament -- 6. Nuclear Weapons, European Security, and Regional Deterrence -- The Impact of Nuclear Weapons: Retrospect and Prospect -- Nuclear Weapons and the European Security System -- Implications for Strategic Planning -- 7. French and British Nuclear Forces in an Era of Uncertainty -- Nuclear Forces as the Core of the French and British Defense Posture -- British and French Nuclear Deterrents in a Multipolar World -- Conclusion -- 8. The New Germany and Nuclear Weapons -- Nuclear Reality and the New Security Landscape -- The Effects of Nuclear Deterrence -- The Erosion of Extended Deterrence -- NATO’s Future Nuclear Strategy: Progression Instead of Regression -- Germany and Nuclear Reality: No Way Out -- Germany and Nuclear Arms Control -- 9. U.S. Nuclear Forces and Japanese/Western Pacific Security.-U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in the East Asia/Western Pacific Region in the Cold War Days --
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Ethics
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Business
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Nuclear physics
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Management science
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Business and Management
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Nuclear Physics
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Political Science
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Political science
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Moral Philosophy and Applied Ethics
|
| 700 |
1 |
|
|a Maaranen, Steven A.
|e [editor]
|
| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
|
| 989 |
|
|
|b SBA
|a Springer Book Archives -2004
|
| 490 |
0 |
|
|a Issues in International Security
|
| 028 |
5 |
0 |
|a 10.1007/978-1-4684-5742-1
|
| 856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-5742-1?nosfx=y
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
|
| 082 |
0 |
|
|a 650
|
| 520 |
|
|
|a Lawrence Freedman One of the major bonuses of the collapse of communism in Europe is that it may never again be necessary to enter into a sterile debate about whether it is better to be "red" or "dead." This appeared as the ultimate question in the great nuclear debate of the early 1980s. When put so starkly the answer appeared obvious better to live and struggle in a totalitarian system than to destroy totalitarian and democratic systems alike. There were a number of points to be made against this. Communist regimes had demonstrated the possibility of being both red and dead while the West had managed successfully to avoid the choice. If we allowed nuclear disarmament to become an overriding priority, this might encourage excessive respect for Soviet interests and a desire to avoid any sort of provocation to Moscow, a point not lost on those in Eastern Europe who were then struggling against repression and could not see why disarmament should be given a higher priority than freedom. Now that the old communist states have liberated themselves and the West no longer risks conspiring in their enslavement, there is a correspondingly re duced danger of mass death. As a result, and with so much else of immediate Lawrence Freedman • Department of War Studies, King's College, University of London, London WC2R 2LS, England. Nuclear Weapons in the Changing World: Perspectives from Europe, Asia, and North America
|