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Computational Auction Mechanisms for Restructured Power Industry Operation

Computational Auction Mechanisms for Restructured Power Industry Operation provides a first introduction to how electricity will be traded as a commodity in the future

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Sheblé, Gerald B.
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: New York, NY Springer US 1999, 1999
Edition:1st ed. 1999
Series:Power Electronics and Power Systems
Subjects:
Electrical And Electronic Engineering
Electrical Engineering
Quantitative Economics
Econometrics
Energy Policy
Energy Policy, Economics And Management
Energy And State
Online Access:
Collection: Springer Book Archives -2004 - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
Table of Contents:
  • 1 Introduction
  • 1.1 History of the Electric Industry
  • 1.2 The Shift Toward Deregulation
  • 1.3 Choosing a Competitive Framework
  • 1.4 Preparing for Competition
  • 1.5 Present Overall Problem
  • 1.6 Economic Evolution
  • 1.7 Market Structure
  • 1.8 Fully Evolved Marketplace
  • 1.9 Computerized Auction Market Structure
  • 1.10 Role of Markets in Society
  • 1.11 Commodity Contracts
  • 1.12 Auction Market Mechanism
  • 1.13 The Spot Market-Place
  • 1.14 Commodity Markets
  • 1.15 Commodity and Futures Trading Commission’s Regulations
  • 1.16 General Exchange Regulations
  • 1.17 The Energy Marketplace
  • 1.18 Regulation of Pricing of Ancillary Services
  • 1.19 Regulatory Questions
  • 1.20 Engineering Research Problems
  • 2 Industrial Infrastructure
  • 2.1 Review of Deregulation
  • 2.2 Auction Mechanisms
  • 2.3 Evaluation and Comparison of Auction Institutions
  • 2.4 Risk Aversion
  • 2.5 Auctions in Industrial Markets
  • 2.6 Overview of Brokerage/auction Systems
  • 2.7 Schweppe’s Theory of Spot Pricing
  • 3 Auction as Linear Program
  • 3.1 Linear Programming
  • 3.2 Basic Discrete Auctions
  • 3.3 Degeneracy and Auctions as an Assignment Problem
  • 3.4 More General Models
  • 3.5 Vertically Integrated Industry
  • 3.6 Decentralization in a Nonlinear Model
  • 4 Economic Dispatch, Unit Commitment, and Optimal Power Flow as Auctions
  • 4.1 Economic Dispatch
  • 4.2 Unit Commitment
  • 4.3 Auction Mechanism with Classical Optimization
  • 4.4 Auction Formulation
  • 4.5 Utilizing Interior-point Linear Programming Algorithm...
  • 4.6 Market Power
  • 4.7 Supporting Services
  • 4.8 Linear Programming or Mixed-integer Programming
  • 4.9 Transmission Loss Allocation
  • 5 General Operations Planning
  • 5.1 General Corporate Model
  • 5.2 Forecasting Demand, Markets, and Competitors
  • 5.3 Multiple Product Production Frontier
  • 5.4Electric Energy Industry Modeling
  • 5.5 Inventory Contract Management
  • 5.6 Cash Management
  • 5.7 Transaction Portfolio Management
  • 5.8 Risk Management
  • 5.9 Futures Allocations
  • 5.10 Auction Market Dynamic Simulation
  • 5.11 AGC Simulator in Price-based Operation
  • 5.12 Advanced Concepts
  • 6 Genco Operation
  • 6.1 Introduction
  • 6.2 GENCO Case Studies
  • 6.3 Building Fuzzy Bidding Strategies for the Competitive Generator
  • 6.4 Profit-based Unit Commitment for the Competitive Environment
  • 6.5 Price-based UC Results
  • 6.6 Handling Uncertainty in Price and Load Forecasts
  • 6.7 Improving Bidding Strategies Through Intelligent Data Mining
  • 6.8 Bidding Strategies for LR Based Power Auction
  • 7 Esco Operation
  • 7.1 Determining Value in a Deregulated Market
  • 7.2 Cost-based Load Management Using LP
  • 7.3 Profit-based Load Management Using LP
  • 7.4 Battery Stored Energy Control for Price-based Operation

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