Cooperative Models in International Relations Research
Cooperative Models in International Relations Michael D. Intriligator and Urs Luterbacher Cooperation problems in international relations research have been asso ciated with a variety of approaches. Game theoretical and rational-choice perspectives have been used extensively to analyze internationa...
| Other Authors: | , |
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
New York, NY
Springer US
1994, 1994
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| Edition: | 1st ed. 1994 |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
| Collection: | Springer Book Archives -2004 - Collection details see MPG.ReNa |
Table of Contents:
- Cooperative Models in International Relations Research
- I Game Theory and Cooperation: General Aspects
- 1 Sources in Game Theory for International Relations Specialists
- 2 On Coalition Games
- 3 From Conflict to Cooperation in the Study of International Security
- 4 A Theory of Cooperation in the Triad
- II Game Theory and Cooperation: Specific Applications
- 5 International Cooperation Among Relative-Gains Maximizers
- 6 The Problem of Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory
- 7 Implementation Through Sequential Unanimity Games
- III Deterrence
- 8 Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World
- 9 A Question of Procedure at the Vienna Arms Talks
- IV Escalation and Crises
- 10 Limited Nuclear Options and the Dynamics of Escalation
- 11 Signaling Difficulties with Linkage in Crisis Bargaining
- 12 Are Crises Rational? A Game-Theoretic Analysis
- V Other Approaches to Modeling International Cooperation
- 13 The Origin of Games: A Theory of the Formation of Ordinal Preferences and Games
- 14 An Economic Analysis of Cooperation in the European Community
- 15 Labor Relations in International Comparison, or Why Humans (and Nations) Sometimes Cooperate and Sometimes Don’t