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140122 ||| eng |
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|a 9781461208419
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| 100 |
1 |
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|a Filar, Jerzy
|e [editor]
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| 245 |
0 |
0 |
|a Control and Game-Theoretic Models of the Environment
|h Elektronische Ressource
|c edited by Jerzy Filar, Carlo Carraro
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| 250 |
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|a 1st ed. 1995
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| 260 |
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|a Boston, MA
|b Birkhäuser
|c 1995, 1995
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| 300 |
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|a XXIII, 357 p
|b online resource
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| 505 |
0 |
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|a 1: Models of Global Change and Sustainable Development -- Differential Game Models of Global Environmental Management -- Sustainability and the Greenhouse Effect: Robustness Analysis of the Assimilation Function -- Consumption of Renewable Environmental Assets, International Coordination and Time Preference -- Sustainable International Agreements on Greenhouse Warming — A Game Theory Study -- The Environmental Costs of Greenhouse Gas Emissions -- 2: Environmental Taxes and Related Issues -- Taxation and Environmental Innovation -- Environmental Quality, Public Finance and Sustainable Growth -- Environmental Pollution and Endogenous Growth: A Comparison Between Emission Taxes and Technological Standards -- Rate-of-Return Regulation, Emission Charges and Behavior of Monopoly -- Polluter’s Capital Quality Standards and Subsidy-Tax Programs for Environmental Externalities: A Competitive Equilibrium Analysis -- 3: Pollution, Renewable Resources and Stability -- The ESS Maximum Principle as a Tool for Modeling and Managing Biological Systems -- Pollution, Renewable Resources and Irreversibility -- The Economic Management of High Seas Fishery Resources: Some Game Theoretic Aspects -- Pollution-Induced Business Cycles: A Game Theoretical Analysis -- Management of Effluent Discharges: A Dynamic Game Model
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| 653 |
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|a Game Theory
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| 653 |
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|a Control theory
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| 653 |
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|a Systems Theory, Control
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| 653 |
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|a Game theory
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| 653 |
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|a System theory
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| 653 |
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|a Mathematical Modeling and Industrial Mathematics
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| 653 |
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|a Mathematical models
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Carraro, Carlo
|e [editor]
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| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b SBA
|a Springer Book Archives -2004
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| 490 |
0 |
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|a Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games
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| 028 |
5 |
0 |
|a 10.1007/978-1-4612-0841-9
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| 856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-0841-9?nosfx=y
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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| 082 |
0 |
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|a 519.3
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| 520 |
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|a This book collects some recent works on the application of dynamic game and control theory to the analysis of environmental problems. This collec tion of papers is not the outcome of a conference or of a workshop. It is rather the result of a careful screening from among a number of contribu tions that we have solicited across the world. In particular, we have been able to attract the work of some of the most prominent scholars in the field of dynamic analyses of the environment. Engineers, mathematicians and economists provide their views and analytical tools to better interpret the interactions between economic and environmental phenomena, thus achiev ing, through this interdisciplinary effort, new and interesting results. The goal of the book is more normative than descriptive. All papers include careful modelling of the dynamics of the main variables involved in the game between nature and economic agents and among economic agents themselves, as well-described in Vrieze's introductory chapter. Fur thermore, all papers use this careful modelling framework to provide policy prescriptions to the public agencies authorized to regulate emission dy namics. Several diverse problems are addressed: from global issues, such as the greenhouse effect or deforestation, to international ones, such as the management of fisheries, to local ones, for example, the control of effluent discharges. Moreover, pollution problems are not the only concern of this book
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