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130626 ||| eng |
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|a 9789048196098
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| 100 |
1 |
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|a Olsson, Erik J.
|e [editor]
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| 245 |
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|a Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science
|h Elektronische Ressource
|c edited by Erik J Olsson, Sebastian Enqvist
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| 250 |
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|a 1st ed. 2011
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| 260 |
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|a Dordrecht
|b Springer Netherlands
|c 2011, 2011
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| 300 |
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|a XX, 359 p
|b online resource
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| 505 |
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|a Editors’ Introduction -- Raúl Carnota and Ricardo Rodríguez: “AGM Theory and Artificial Intelligence” -- Sven Ove Hansson: “Changing the Scientific Corpus” -- Hans Rott: “Idealization, Intertheory Explanations and Conditionals” -- Gerhard Schurz: “Abductive Belief Revision in Science” -- Sebastian Enqvist: “A Structuralist Framework for the Logic of Theory Change ” -- Peter Gärdenfors and Frank Zenker: “Using Conceptual Spaces to Model the Dynamics -- of Empirical Theories” -- Bengt Hansson: “A Note on Theory Change and Belief Revision” -- Horacio Arlo-Costa and Arthur Paul Pedersen: “Social Norms, Rational Choice and Belief Change” -- David Westlund: “Rational Belief Changes for Collective Agents” -- Emmanuel Genot: “The Best of All Possible Worlds: Where Interrogative Games Meet -- Research Agendas” -- Isaac Levi: “Knowledge as True Belief” -- Caroline Semmling and Heinrich Wansing: “Reasoning about Belief Revision” -- Paul Thagard: “Changing Minds about Climate Change: Belief Revision, Coherence, and -- Emotion” -- Jonas Nilsson and Sten Lindström: “Rationality in Flux: Formal Representations of -- Methodological Change”
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| 653 |
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|a Logic
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| 653 |
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|a Science / Philosophy
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| 653 |
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|a Philosophy of Science
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Enqvist, Sebastian
|e [editor]
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| 041 |
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7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b Springer
|a Springer eBooks 2005-
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| 490 |
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|a Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science
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| 028 |
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|a 10.1007/978-90-481-9609-8
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| 856 |
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|u https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9609-8?nosfx=y
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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|a 501
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|a Belief revision theory and philosophy of science both aspire to shed light on the dynamics of knowledge – on how our view of the world changes (typically) in the light of new evidence. Yet these two areas of research have long seemed strangely detached from each other, as witnessed by the small number of cross-references and researchers working in both domains. One may speculate as to what has brought about this surprising, and perhaps unfortunate, state of affairs. One factor may be that while belief revision theory has traditionally been pursued in a bottom- up manner, focusing on the endeavors of single inquirers, philosophers of science, inspired by logical empiricism, have tended to be more interested in science as a multi-agent or agent-independent phenomenon
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