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130626 ||| eng |
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|a 9789048132850
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|a Tännsjö, Torbjörn
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| 245 |
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|a From Reasons to Norms
|h Elektronische Ressource
|b On the Basic Question in Ethics
|c by Torbjörn Tännsjö
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| 250 |
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|a 1st ed. 2010
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| 260 |
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|a Dordrecht
|b Springer Netherlands
|c 2010, 2010
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| 300 |
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|a XVI, 168 p
|b online resource
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| 505 |
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|a The Humean Notion of Practical Reasons -- The Moral Notion of Practical Reason -- In Defence of Moral Realism -- Some Consequences of Moral Realism -- Reasons from Prudence and Rationality -- Reasons from Justice and Aesthetics -- Reasons to Believe -- Reasons to Desire -- Conclusion
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| 653 |
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|a Ethics
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| 653 |
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|a Philosophy
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| 653 |
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|a Moral Philosophy and Applied Ethics
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| 041 |
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7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b Springer
|a Springer eBooks 2005-
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| 490 |
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|a Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy
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| 028 |
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|a 10.1007/978-90-481-3285-0
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| 856 |
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|u https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3285-0?nosfx=y
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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| 082 |
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|a 170
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| 520 |
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|a This book originated from a discussion between the author, Derek Parfit and Wlodek Rabinowicz, and further developed in correspondence and intense discussions with Wlodek Rabinowics and John Broome. The author disputes the recent trend in metaethics that focuses on reasons rather than norms. The reader is invited to take a new look at the traditional metaethical questions of moral semantics, ontology, and epistemology. The author mainly concerns himself with particular aspects of these problems: Which are the problems of morality? Are there many different moral questions, or, do they all, in the final analysis, reduce to one? The bold claim made in this book is that there is just one: What ought to be done? Moreover, there is just one source of normativity, just one kind of 'ought'-question, which lends itself to an objectively correct and authoritative answer
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