Strategic Social Choice Stable Representations of Constitutions
This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in...
Main Authors: | , |
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Format: | eBook |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Berlin, Heidelberg
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
2010, 2010
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Edition: | 1st ed. 2010 |
Series: | Studies in Choice and Welfare
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | |
Collection: | Springer eBooks 2005- - Collection details see MPG.ReNa |
Summary: | This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. A central interpretation of an effectivity function is that it models a constitution |
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Physical Description: | XVIII, 154 p. 2 illus online resource |
ISBN: | 9783642138751 |