Fairness in Bargaining and Markets

This book contributes to behavioral economic research on the central issue of social preferences, focusing on the implications of social fairness norms on the interaction of market participants. The author uses both game-theoretic and experimental methods to analyze the implications of social fairne...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Korth, Christian
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Berlin, Heidelberg Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2009, 2009
Edition:1st ed. 2009
Series:Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
Subjects:
Online Access:
Collection: Springer eBooks 2005- - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
LEADER 02106nmm a2200289 u 4500
001 EB000382465
003 EBX01000000000000000235517
005 00000000000000.0
007 cr|||||||||||||||||||||
008 130626 ||| eng
020 |a 9783642022531 
100 1 |a Korth, Christian 
245 0 0 |a Fairness in Bargaining and Markets  |h Elektronische Ressource  |c by Christian Korth 
250 |a 1st ed. 2009 
260 |a Berlin, Heidelberg  |b Springer Berlin Heidelberg  |c 2009, 2009 
300 |a XV, 175 p  |b online resource 
505 0 |a Bargaining Theory -- Game Theory and Fairness Preferences -- Reciprocity#x2014;An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis -- Fairness Norms in Ultimatum Exchanges -- Fairness, Price Stickiness, and History Dependence in Decentralized Trade -- Generalizations and Extensions of the Decentralized Trade Model -- Price Rigidity in an Experimental Market 
653 |a Microeconomics 
653 |a Quantitative Economics 
653 |a Econometrics 
041 0 7 |a eng  |2 ISO 639-2 
989 |b Springer  |a Springer eBooks 2005- 
490 0 |a Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems 
028 5 0 |a 10.1007/978-3-642-02253-1 
856 4 0 |u https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02253-1?nosfx=y  |x Verlag  |3 Volltext 
082 0 |a 330.9 
520 |a This book contributes to behavioral economic research on the central issue of social preferences, focusing on the implications of social fairness norms on the interaction of market participants. The author uses both game-theoretic and experimental methods to analyze the implications of social fairness norms on the outcomes of bilateral bargaining situations. It is shown that a preference for reciprocity is evolutionarily stable in a "game of life" that consists of bilateral bargaining situations. The fairness benchmark or reference that such a preference depends on is investigated through a classroom experiment. Furthermore, the book presents a theoretical analysis of a market model as well as an experimental laboratory study to explore the implications of fairness concerns for price formation in matching markets