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130626  eng 
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a 9783540287278

100 
1 

a Namatame, Akira
e [editor]

245 
0 
0 
a The Complex Networks of Economic Interactions
h Elektronische Ressource
b Essays in AgentBased Economics and Econophysics
c edited by Akira Namatame, Taisei Kaizouji, Yuuji Aruka

250 


a 1st ed. 2006

260 


a Berlin, Heidelberg
b Springer Berlin Heidelberg
c 2006, 2006

300 


a XI, 347 p
b online resource

505 
0 

a Econophysics  Five Years of Continuoustime Random Walks in Econophysics  Why Macroeconomic Price Indices are Sluggish in Large Economies ?  Growth Volatility Indices  Financial Fragility and Scaling Distributions in the Laboratory  Complex Economic Network  Heterogeneous Economic Networks  The Emergence of Paradigm Setters Through Firms’ Interaction and Network Formation  Economic Dynamics  Statistical Properties of a Heterogeneous Asset Pricing Model with Timevarying Second Moment  Deflationary Recessions in a General Equilibrium Framework  Concepts of Thermodynamics in Economic Growth  Firm Dynamics Simulation Using Gametheoretic Stochastic Agents  Agentbased Modeling  A Functional Modularity Approach to Agentbased Modeling of the Evolution of Technology  Herding Without Following the Herd: The Dynamics of CaseBased Decisions with Local Interactions  Cultural Evolution in a Population of Heterogeneous Agents  Auction and Twosided Matching  Simulating Auctions  Counterclockwise Behavior Around the Beveridge Curve  The WaitingTime Distribution of Trading Activity in a Double Auction Artificial Financial Market  Minority Games and Collectie Intelligence  Theoretical Analysis of Local Information Transmission in Competitive Populations  Analysis of Complexity and Time Restriction in Resources Allocation Problems  How Does Collective Intelligence Emerge in the Standard Minority Game?  Gametheoretic Approach  What Information Theory Says About Bounded Rational Best Response  Evolution of Reciprocal Cooperation in the Avatamsaka Game  Game Representation  Code Form  Effect of Mutual Choice Metanorm in Group Dynamics for Solving Social Dilemmas

653 


a Complex Systems

653 


a Computer Application in Social and Behavioral Sciences

653 


a Social sciences / Data processing

653 


a System theory

653 


a Quantitative Economics

653 


a Mathematical physics

653 


a Econometrics

653 


a Theoretical, Mathematical and Computational Physics

700 
1 

a Kaizouji, Taisei
e [editor]

700 
1 

a Aruka, Yuuji
e [editor]

041 
0 
7 
a eng
2 ISO 6392

989 


b Springer
a Springer eBooks 2005

490 
0 

a Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems

028 
5 
0 
a 10.1007/3540287272

856 
4 
0 
u https://doi.org/10.1007/3540287272?nosfx=y
x Verlag
3 Volltext

082 
0 

a 330.9

520 


a Understanding the mechanism of a socioeconomic system requires more than an understanding of the individuals that comprise the system. It also requires understanding how individuals interact with each other, and how the agg gated outcome can be more than the sum of individual behaviors. This book contains the papers fostering the formation of an active multidisciplinary community on socioeconomic systems with the exciting new ?elds of age based modeling and econophysics. We especially intend to increase the awareness of researchers in many ?elds with sharing the common view many economic and social activities as collectives of a largescale heterogeneous and interacting agents. Economists seek to understand not only how individuals behave but also how the interaction of many individuals leads to complex outcomes. Age based modeling is a method for studying socioeconomic systems exhibiting the following two properties: (1) the system is composed of interacting agents, and (2) the system exhibits emergent properties, that is, properties arising from the interactions of the agents that cannot be deduced simply by agg gating the properties of the system’s components. When the interaction of the agents is contingent on past experience, and especially when the agents continually adapt to that experience, mathematical analysis is typically very limited in its ability to derive the outcome
