Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy

Public choice is the study of behavior at the intersection of economics and political science. Since the pioneering work of Duncan Black in the 1940s, public choice has developed a rich literature, drawing from such related perspectives as history, philosophy, law, and sociology, to analyze politica...

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Bibliographic Details
Other Authors: Rowley, Charles (Editor), Schneider, Friedrich (Editor)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: New York, NY Springer US 2008, 2008
Edition:1st ed. 2008
Subjects:
Online Access:
Collection: Springer eBooks 2005- - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
Table of Contents:
  • Introductory Overviews
  • Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy
  • Public Choice: An Introduction
  • Public Choice Trailblazers versus the Tyranny of the Intellectual Establishment
  • Biographies of the Founding Fathers
  • Duncan Black (1908–1991)
  • Kenneth J. Arrow (1921 - )
  • Anthony Downs (1930 - )
  • James M. Buchanan (1919- )
  • Gordon Tullock (1922- )
  • Mancur Lloyd Olson (1932–1998)
  • William H. Riker (1920–1993)
  • Milton Friedman (1912–2006)
  • Perspectives
  • The Perspective of the History of Thought
  • The Perspective of Economics
  • The Perspective of Philosophy
  • The Perspective of Law
  • The Perspective of Sociology
  • Fundamental Principles
  • Constitutional Political Economy
  • Spatial Theory
  • Social Choice, Coase Theorem, Contracts, and Logrolling
  • Interest Group Behavior and Influence
  • Dictatorship
  • Applications
  • Public Finance
  • Taxation
  • The Political Economy of Monetary Policy Conduct and Central Bank Design
  • Regulation And Antitrust
  • International Trade Policy: Departure From Free Trade
  • Trade Liberalization and Globalization
  • Shadow Economy
  • Vote and Popularity Functions
  • Corruption
  • Environmental Politics
  • Experimental Public Choice
  • The Political Economy of Swarming in Honeybees: Voting-with-the-Wings, Decision-Making Costs, and the Unanimity Rule