Fair Inheritance Taxation

This paper studies the optimal taxation of bequests in a model in which agents have heterogeneous preferences over their consumption and the net-of-tax bequest received by their heir. The bequest left by an individual depends on both her degree of altruism and the bequest received from her parents....

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Decerf, Benoit
Other Authors: Maniquet, Francois
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Washington, D.C The World Bank 2021
Subjects:
Online Access:
Collection: World Bank E-Library Archive - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
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245 0 0 |a Fair Inheritance Taxation  |h Elektronische Ressource  |c Benoit Decerf 
260 |a Washington, D.C  |b The World Bank  |c 2021 
300 |a 43 pages 
653 |a Macroeconomics and Economic Growth 
653 |a Taxation and Subsidies 
653 |a Responsibility 
653 |a Tax Law 
653 |a Fairness 
653 |a Compensation 
653 |a Inequality 
653 |a Law and Development 
653 |a Poverty Reduction 
653 |a Tax Exemption 
653 |a Inheritance Tax 
653 |a Taxation 
700 1 |a Maniquet, Francois 
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082 0 |a 330 
520 |a This paper studies the optimal taxation of bequests in a model in which agents have heterogeneous preferences over their consumption and the net-of-tax bequest received by their heir. The bequest left by an individual depends on both her degree of altruism and the bequest received from her parents. First, the paper studies two principles that are at the heart of the debates on taxing inheritances: (1) children should not be penalized by the lack of altruism of their parents, and (2) parents should be free to choose their bequests. Only one social welfare function satisfies these two principles, together with Pareto efficiency and a separability principle. Second, the paper studies the shape of the inheritance tax scheme that maximizes this social welfare function. It shows that in the aggregate, the inheritance tax must collect money (redistributed through a non-negative demogrant). Moreover, small bequests cannot be taxed (they can potentially be subsidized), while bequests that are larger than those of the most altruistic individuals who did not receive bequests from their parents should be taxed as much as efficiency permits