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221013 ||| eng |
| 100 |
1 |
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|a Zhang, Fan
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| 245 |
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|a Rate of Return Regulation and Emission Permits Trading under Uncertainty
|h Elektronische Ressource
|c Zhang, Fan
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C
|b The World Bank
|c 2015
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| 300 |
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|a 31 p
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Zhang, Fan
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Huang, Tao
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| 041 |
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7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b WOBA
|a World Bank E-Library Archive
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| 490 |
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|a World Bank E-Library Archive
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| 028 |
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|a 10.1596/1813-9450-7343
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| 856 |
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|u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/1813-9450-7343
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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|a 330
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|a This paper analyzes the dynamic effects of rate-of-return regulation on firms'emissions compliance behavior when the price of emissions permits is uncertain. The paper shows that uncertainty regarding the price of permits would motivate a regulated firm to adopt a more self-sufficient strategy and would reduce the cost-effectiveness of emission allowance trading. When allowance transactions are treated as capital investments, uncertainty could reverse the classic Averch-Johnson effect, so that a regulated firm would purchase fewer permits in the ex ante period than its unregulated counterpart. These results are driven by the asymmetric impact of a price change on the expected marginal value of allowances under rate-of-return regulation. A wider variation in the permit price and a decline in the regulated rate of return would amplify the asymmetry. These results have implications for the efficiency of the proposed global carbon trading system
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