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| 007 |
cr||||||||||||||||||||| |
| 008 |
221013 ||| eng |
| 100 |
1 |
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|a Cusolito, Ana
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| 245 |
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|a Corporate Governance and Public Corruption
|h Elektronische Ressource
|c Cusolito, Ana
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C
|b The World Bank
|c 2010
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| 300 |
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|a 35 p
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Cusolito, Ana
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| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b WOBA
|a World Bank E-Library Archive
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| 028 |
5 |
0 |
|a 10.1596/1813-9450-5233
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| 856 |
4 |
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|u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/1813-9450-5233
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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| 082 |
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|a 330
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| 520 |
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|a Corporate governance in the private sector and corruption are important for economic development and private sector development. This paper investigates how corporate governance in private-sector media companies can affect public corruption. The analytical framework, based on models of corporate governance, identifies two channels through which media ownership concentration affects corruption: an owner effect, which discourages corruption and a competition-for-control effect that enhances it. When the ownership structure of a newspaper has a majority shareholder, the first effect dominates and corruption decreases as ownership becomes more concentrated in the hands of majority shareholders. Without majority shareholders, the competition-for-control effect dominates and corruption increases with the concentration of ownership of the media company. Thus, the paper shows that cases of intermediate media-ownership concentration are the worst at promoting public accountability, while extreme situations, where the ownership is completely concentrated or widely held, can result in similar and lower levels of corruption
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