Optimal pre-merger notification mechanisms incentives and efficiency of mandatory and voluntary schemes

"The authors compare the two merger control systems currently employed worldwide: a mandatory system based on merger size threshold and a voluntary system with ex-post monitoring and fines. The voluntary system possesses two informational advantages: (i) the enforcement agency employs more info...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Rodríguez González, Aldo Javier
Corporate Author: World Bank
Other Authors: Benítez, Daniel
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: [Washington, D.C] World Bank 2009
Series:Policy research working paper
Subjects:
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Collection: World Bank E-Library Archive - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
Description
Summary:"The authors compare the two merger control systems currently employed worldwide: a mandatory system based on merger size threshold and a voluntary system with ex-post monitoring and fines. The voluntary system possesses two informational advantages: (i) the enforcement agency employs more information -verifiable and non verifiable parameters- to decide the set of mergers to investigate, and (ii) the first move of merging firms reveals useful information to the agency about the competitive risk of a merger. If fines for undue omission to notify are upward limited, then a mixed mechanism is optimal, where small transactions are under a voluntary regime while the big mergers are obliged to report. Remedies for fixing anticompetitive mergers act as an instrument that induces firms to notify the operation, improving further the advantage of the voluntary mechanism. "--World Bank web site
Item Description:Includes bibliographical references. - Title from PDF file as viewed on 5/26/2009