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221013 ||| eng |
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|a Keefer, Philip
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|a When do special interests run rampant?
|h Elektronische Ressource
|b disentangling the role of elections, incomplete information, and checks and balances in banking crises
|c Philip Keefer
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C
|b World Bank, Development Research Group, Regulation and Competition Policy
|c 2001
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| 653 |
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|a Fiscal policy / Mathematical models
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| 653 |
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|a Financial crises / Mathematical models
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| 653 |
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|a Banks and banking / Political aspects / Mathematical models
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| 710 |
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|a World Bank
|b Development Research Group
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| 041 |
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|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b WOBA
|a World Bank E-Library Archive
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|a Policy research working paper
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|a "February 2001"--Cover. - Includes bibliographical references (p. 45-47). - Title from title screen as viewed on Sept. 18, 2002
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|u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2543
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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|a 330
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|a Government responses to banking crises are less likely to favor special interest groups when elections are near, voters are better informed about the costs of inefficient government decisions, and governments have multiple veto players. Keefer investigates the political determinants of government decisions that benefit special interest groups, especially government decisions to deal with banking crises. He finds that the better informed the voters, the more proximate elections, and the larger the number of political veto players (conditional on the costs to voters of relevant policy decisions), the smaller the government's fiscal transfers are to the financial sector and the less likely the government is to exercise forbearance in dealing with insolvent financial institutions
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