Optimal Monetary Policy Under Bounded Rationality

The form of bounded rationality characterizing the representative agent is key in the choice of the optimal monetary policy regime. While inflation targeting prevails for myopia that distorts agents' inflation expectations, price level targeting emerges as the optimal policy under myopia regard...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Benchimol, Jonathan
Other Authors: Bounader, Lahcen
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Washington, D.C. International Monetary Fund 2019
Series:IMF Working Papers
Subjects:
Online Access:
Collection: International Monetary Fund - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
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260 |a Washington, D.C.  |b International Monetary Fund  |c 2019 
300 |a 52 pages 
653 |a Depository Institutions 
653 |a Interest rates 
653 |a Inflation 
653 |a Banks 
653 |a Finance 
653 |a Economic Theory 
653 |a Output gap 
653 |a Banks and banking 
653 |a Real interest rates 
653 |a Deflation 
653 |a Consumer Economics: Theory 
653 |a Neoclassical through 1925 (Austrian, Marshallian, Walrasian, Wicksellian) 
653 |a Micro Finance Institutions 
653 |a Production 
653 |a Economic theory & philosophy 
653 |a Mortgages 
653 |a Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles: Forecasting and Simulation 
653 |a Macroeconomics: Production 
653 |a Price Level 
653 |a Neoclassical theory 
653 |a Forecasting and Other Model Applications 
653 |a Banks and Banking 
653 |a Prices 
653 |a Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles 
653 |a Macroeconomics 
653 |a Banking 
653 |a Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects 
653 |a Economic theory 
653 |a Monetary Policy 
653 |a Neoclassical school of economics 
653 |a Production and Operations Management 
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520 |a The form of bounded rationality characterizing the representative agent is key in the choice of the optimal monetary policy regime. While inflation targeting prevails for myopia that distorts agents' inflation expectations, price level targeting emerges as the optimal policy under myopia regarding the output gap, revenue, or interest rate. To the extent that bygones are not bygones under price level targeting, rational inflation expectations is a minimal condition for optimality in a behavioral world. Instrument rules implementation of this optimal policy is shown to be infeasible, questioning the ability of simple rules à la Taylor (1993) to assist the conduct of monetary policy. Bounded rationality is not necessarily associated with welfare losses