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220928 ||| eng |
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|a 9781498324588
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100 |
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|a Benchimol, Jonathan
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|a Optimal Monetary Policy Under Bounded Rationality
|c Jonathan Benchimol, Lahcen Bounader
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260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2019
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300 |
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|a 52 pages
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653 |
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|a Depository Institutions
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653 |
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|a Interest rates
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653 |
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|a Inflation
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653 |
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|a Banks
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653 |
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|a Finance
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653 |
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|a Economic Theory
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653 |
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|a Output gap
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653 |
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|a Banks and banking
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653 |
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|a Real interest rates
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653 |
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|a Deflation
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653 |
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|a Consumer Economics: Theory
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653 |
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|a Neoclassical through 1925 (Austrian, Marshallian, Walrasian, Wicksellian)
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653 |
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|a Micro Finance Institutions
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653 |
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|a Production
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653 |
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|a Economic theory & philosophy
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653 |
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|a Mortgages
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653 |
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|a Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles: Forecasting and Simulation
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653 |
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|a Macroeconomics: Production
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653 |
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|a Price Level
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653 |
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|a Neoclassical theory
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653 |
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|a Forecasting and Other Model Applications
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653 |
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|a Banks and Banking
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653 |
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|a Prices
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653 |
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|a Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
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653 |
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|a Macroeconomics
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653 |
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|a Banking
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653 |
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|a Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
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653 |
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|a Economic theory
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653 |
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|a Monetary Policy
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653 |
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|a Neoclassical school of economics
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653 |
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|a Production and Operations Management
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700 |
1 |
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|a Bounader, Lahcen
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|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a 10.5089/9781498324588.001
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856 |
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|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2019/166/001.2019.issue-166-en.xml?cid=47048-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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|a 330
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|a The form of bounded rationality characterizing the representative agent is key in the choice of the optimal monetary policy regime. While inflation targeting prevails for myopia that distorts agents' inflation expectations, price level targeting emerges as the optimal policy under myopia regarding the output gap, revenue, or interest rate. To the extent that bygones are not bygones under price level targeting, rational inflation expectations is a minimal condition for optimality in a behavioral world. Instrument rules implementation of this optimal policy is shown to be infeasible, questioning the ability of simple rules à la Taylor (1993) to assist the conduct of monetary policy. Bounded rationality is not necessarily associated with welfare losses
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