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220928 ||| eng |
020 |
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|a 9781498316811
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100 |
1 |
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|a Lian, Weicheng
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245 |
0 |
0 |
|a Technological Changes, Offshoring, and the Labor Share
|c Weicheng Lian
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260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2019
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300 |
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|a 57 pages
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651 |
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4 |
|a United States
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653 |
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|a Manufacturing industries
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653 |
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|a Institutional Investors
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653 |
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|a Stocks
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653 |
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|a Pension Funds
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653 |
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|a Labour
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653 |
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|a Financial institutions
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653 |
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|a Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General
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653 |
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|a Financial Instruments
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653 |
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|a Globalization: Labor
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653 |
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|a Open Economy Macroeconomics
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653 |
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|a Manufacturing
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653 |
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|a Long-term Capital Movements
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653 |
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|a Aggregate Factor Income Distribution
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653 |
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|a Economic sectors
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653 |
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|a Industry Studies: Manufacturing: General
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653 |
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|a Globalization: Macroeconomic Impacts
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653 |
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|a Labor
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653 |
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|a Industries: Manufacturing
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653 |
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|a Macroeconomics: Production
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653 |
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|a Non-bank Financial Institutions
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653 |
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|a Labor share
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653 |
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|a Labor Economics: General
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653 |
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|a Investments: Stocks
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653 |
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|a Macroeconomics
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653 |
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|a Wages
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653 |
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|a Investment & securities
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653 |
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|a Trade and Labor Market Interactions
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653 |
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|a Income economics
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653 |
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|a Neoclassical Models of Trade
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653 |
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|a International Investment
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653 |
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|a Globalization: Economic Development
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653 |
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|a Labor economics
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041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
|
490 |
0 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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028 |
5 |
0 |
|a 10.5089/9781498316811.001
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856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2019/142/001.2019.issue-142-en.xml?cid=46912-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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082 |
0 |
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|a 330
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520 |
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|a Existing studies on the downward trend in the labor share of income mostly focus on changes within individual countries. I document, however, that half of the global decline in the labor share of income can be traced to the relocation of activities between countries. I develop a two-country model to show that when the relative price of investment goods falls, production activities with a small elasticity of substitution between capital and labor tend to get offshored from high- to low-wage countries. The model provides an explanation as to why such relocation may drive the labor share down in both developed and developing economies, as well as globally
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