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220928 ||| eng |
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|a 9781484380642
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| 100 |
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|a Agur, Itai
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| 245 |
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|a Monetary and Macroprudential Policy Coordination Among Multiple Equilibria
|c Itai Agur
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2018
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| 300 |
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|a 33 pages
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| 653 |
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|a Economic policy
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| 653 |
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|a Interest rates
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| 653 |
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|a Finance
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| 653 |
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|a Output gap
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| 653 |
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|a Financial sector stability
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| 653 |
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|a Policy Designs and Consistency
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| 653 |
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|a General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation
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| 653 |
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|a Noncooperative Games
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| 653 |
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|a Production
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| 653 |
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|a Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
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| 653 |
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|a Macroeconomics: Production
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| 653 |
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|a Policy Objectives
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| 653 |
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|a Policy Coordination
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| 653 |
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|a Banks and Banking
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| 653 |
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|a Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
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| 653 |
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|a Macroeconomics
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| 653 |
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|a Financial services industry
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| 653 |
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|a Banking
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| 653 |
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|a Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
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| 653 |
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|a Central Banks and Their Policies
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| 653 |
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|a Economic theory
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| 653 |
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|a Macroprudential policy
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| 653 |
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|a Finance: General
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| 653 |
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|a Production and Operations Management
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| 653 |
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|a Central bank policy rate
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| 041 |
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7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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| 490 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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| 028 |
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|a 10.5089/9781484380642.001
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| 856 |
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|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2018/235/001.2018.issue-235-en.xml?cid=46289-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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| 082 |
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|a 330
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| 520 |
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|a The notion of a tradeoff between output and financial stabilization is based on monetary-macroprudential models with unique equilibria. Using a game theory setup, this paper shows that multiple equilibria lead to qualitatively different results. Monetary and macroprudential authorities have tools that impose externalities on each other's objectives. One of the tools (macroprudential) is coarse, while the other (monetary policy) is unconstrained. We find that this asymmetry always leads to multiple equilibria, and show that under economically relevant conditions the authorities prefer different equilibria. Giving the unconstrained authority a weight on "helping" the constrained authority ("leaning against the wind") now has unexpected effects. The relation between this weight and the difficulty of coordinating is hump-shaped, and therefore a small degree of leaning worsens outcomes on both authorities' objectives
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