|
|
|
|
| LEADER |
03330nam a2200397 u 4500 |
| 001 |
EB001843256 |
| 003 |
EBX01000000000000001007245 |
| 005 |
00000000000000.0 |
| 007 |
tu||||||||||||||||||||| |
| 008 |
180730 r ||| eng |
| 020 |
|
|
|z 0833087398
|
| 020 |
|
|
|a 0833087398
|
| 020 |
|
|
|z 9780833087393
|
| 020 |
|
|
|a 9780833087393
|
| 050 |
|
4 |
|a UF503
|
| 100 |
1 |
|
|a Arena, Mark V.
|
| 245 |
0 |
0 |
|a Management perspectives pertaining to Root Cause Analyses of Nunn-McCurdy Breaches, Volume 6
|h Elektronische Ressource
|b contractor motivations and anticipating breaches
|c Mark V. Arena, John Birkler, Irv Blickstein, Charles Nemfakos, Abby Doll, Jeffrey A. Drezner, Gordon T. Lee, Megan McKernan, Brian McInnis, Carter C. Price, Jerry M. Sollinger, Erin York
|
| 260 |
|
|
|a Santa Monica, CA
|b RAND
|c [2014]©2014, 2014
|
| 300 |
|
|
|a xxvi, 108 pages
|b color illustrations
|
| 505 |
0 |
|
|a Introduction -- Contractor Incentives -- A Methodology for Anticipating Nunn-McCurdy Breaches -- Concluding Observations -- Appendix A: Membership of the COG -- Appendix B: Truth-Revealing Incentive Mechanisms Manages Asymmetric Information Example -- C: Executive Compensation -- Appendix D: Exploration of Multiyear Use -- Appendix E: Evolution of Nunn-McCurdy Legislation
|
| 505 |
0 |
|
|a Includes bibliographical references (pages 103-108)
|
| 651 |
|
4 |
|a United States / fast
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Motivation (Psychology)
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a POLITICAL SCIENCE / Political Freedom
|
| 700 |
1 |
|
|a Birkler, J. L.
|e [author]
|
| 700 |
1 |
|
|a Blickstein, Irv
|e [author]
|
| 700 |
1 |
|
|a Nemfakos, Charles Panagiotis
|e [author]
|
| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
|
| 989 |
|
|
|b ZDB-39-JOA
|a JSTOR Open Access Books
|
| 500 |
|
|
|a "RAND National Defense Research Institute.". - "Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense.". - "This research was sponsored by OSD PARCA and conducted within the Acquisition and Technology Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute"--Preface
|
| 024 |
8 |
|
|a RAND/MG-1171/6-OSD
|
| 776 |
|
|
|z 0833090089
|
| 776 |
|
|
|z 9780833090089
|
| 856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt14bs3kg
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
|
| 082 |
0 |
|
|a 355.820973
|
| 520 |
|
|
|a With an eye to making defense acquisition more effective and efficient, the authors explore defense contractor motivations in pursuing defense contracts and identify mechanisms that might more closely align those incentives with Department of Defense goals. They enumerate several motivations that drive contractors, most of which center on the financial aspects of running an enterprise. Then, they turn to the other side of the negotiating table and identify areas of influence or levers that the government can use to align the contracting process more closely with contractor motivations. They also analyze major defense acquisition programs to determine if it is possible to identify programs that might incur a future Nunn-McCurdy breach by reviewing a number of acquisition programs that have incurred breaches in the past and analyzing them for common characteristics. Their analytic framework enables oversight officials to identify programs with a greater risk of incurring a critical cost breach, which enables officials to focus more intently on a smaller set of programs and which provides hypotheses about what to look for in these programs
|