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180730 r ||| eng |
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|a 9781282033252
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|a 1282033255
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|z 9780833044655
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|a 9780833044655
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|a 9786612033254
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|a 6612033258
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|z 0833044656
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|a 0833044656
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|a HV6431
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|a Jones, Seth G.
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|a How terrorist groups end
|h Elektronische Ressource
|b lessons for countering Al Qa'ida
|c Seth G. Jones, Martin C. Libicki
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| 260 |
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|a Santa Monica, CA
|b Rand
|c 2008, ©2008©2008
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| 300 |
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|a xxiii, 227 pages
|b illustrations, maps
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|a Includes bibliographical references and index
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|a Introduction -- How terrorist groups end -- Policing and Japan's Aum Shinrikyo -- Politics and the FMLN in El Salvador -- Military force and Al Qa'ida in Iraq -- The limits of America's Al Qa'ida strategy -- Ending the 'war' on terrorism
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| 610 |
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|a Qaida (Organization)
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| 653 |
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|a Problem-oriented policing
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|a Intelligence service
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|a POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General
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| 653 |
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|a POLITICAL SCIENCE / Political Freedom & Security / Terrorism
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| 653 |
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|a Terrorism
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| 700 |
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|a Libicki, Martin C.
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|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b ZDB-39-JOA
|a JSTOR Open Access Books
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| 500 |
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|a Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002
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|a RAND/MG-741-1-RC
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|z 9780833046406
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| 776 |
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|z 0833046403
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| 856 |
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|u https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg741rc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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|a 363.325/16
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| 520 |
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|a All terrorist groups eventually end. But how? Most modern groups have ended because they joined the political process or local police and intelligence agencies arrested or killed key members. This has significant implications for dealing with al Qa'ida and suggests fundamentally rethinking post-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism strategy: Policing and intelligence, not military force, should form the backbone of U.S. efforts against al Qa'ida
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