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Fiscal Rules for Subnational Governments Can They Promote Fiscal Discipline?

Experience indicates that fiscal rules can be helpful as a disciplinary device at the central government level. This article explores whether fiscal rules could be usefully adopted in a decentralised framework, where the behaviour of subnational governments may undermine fiscal discipline

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Ter-Minassian, Teresa
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Paris OECD Publishing 2007
Subjects:
Governance
Online Access:
Collection: OECD Books and Papers - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
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