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180616 ||| eng |
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|a Blöchliger, Hansjörg
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|a Fiscal Consolidation Across Government Levels - Part 3. Intergovernmental Grants, Pro- or Counter-cyclical?
|h Elektronische Ressource
|c Hansjörg, Blöchliger and Balázs, Égert
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|a Assainissement budgétaire aux différents niveaux d'administration - Partie 3. Les dons interadministrations ont-ils un effet pro ou anticyclique ? / Hansjörg, Blöchliger et Balázs, Égert
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|a Assainissement budgétaire aux différents niveaux d'administration - Partie 3. Les dons interadministrations ont-ils un effet pro ou anticyclique ?
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|a Paris
|b OECD Publishing
|c 2013
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|a 15 p.
|c 21 x 29.7cm
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|a Economics
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|a Taxation
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|a Égert, Balázs
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|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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|b OECD
|a OECD Books and Papers
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|a OECD Economics Department Working Papers
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|a 10.1787/5k43nxqrlmtf-en
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|a oecd-ilibrary.org
|u https://doi.org/10.1787/5k43nxqrlmtf-en
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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|a 336
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|a This paper provides empirical analysis that measures the cyclical properties of intergovernmental transfers (or grants). Modelling a fiscal policy reaction function this paper tests whether the transfers systems in OECD countries are pro- or counter-cyclical, i.e. whether they offset cyclical fluctuations of sub-central economies or, on the contrary, exacerbate them. Regression results suggest that transfer systems tend to be pro-cyclical in general and in more than half of OECD countries they tend to destabilise sub-central budgets. Transfer pro-cyclicality may be the result of several factors: Transfer spending is often determined as a share of central government tax revenue, which itself tends to fluctuate with the cycle. Moreover, many grants are matching sub-central spending and hence tend to exacerbate fluctuations of that sub-central spending. Pro-cyclical grants could partly explain the often observed pro-cyclicality of subcentral government fiscal policy
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