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008 180614 ||| eng
020 |a 9781484328491 
100 1 |a Daniel, Philip 
245 0 0 |a How Should Shale Gas Extraction Be Taxed?  |c Philip Daniel, Alan Krupnick, Thornton Matheson, Peter Mullins, Ian Parry, Artur Swistak 
260 |a Washington, D.C.  |b International Monetary Fund  |c 2017 
300 |a 39 pages 
651 4 |a United States 
653 |a Energy: Demand and Supply 
653 |a Optimal Taxation 
653 |a Environmental Economics 
653 |a Industries: Energy 
653 |a Public finance & taxation 
653 |a Environmental economics 
653 |a Oil 
653 |a Investments: Energy 
653 |a Environmental Taxes and Subsidies 
653 |a Gas industry 
653 |a Environmental sciences 
653 |a Environmental Economics: Government Policy 
653 |a Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy 
653 |a Commodities 
653 |a Energy: General 
653 |a Macroeconomics 
653 |a Taxation 
653 |a Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities 
653 |a Energy: Government Policy 
653 |a Petroleum, oil & gas industries 
653 |a Environmental Economics: General 
653 |a Oil prices 
653 |a Environment 
653 |a Natural gas sector 
653 |a Hydrocarbon Resources 
653 |a Fuel prices 
653 |a Economic sectors 
653 |a Petroleum industry and trade 
653 |a Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General 
653 |a Efficiency 
653 |a Prices 
653 |a Tax incentives 
653 |a Investment & securities 
653 |a Redistributive Effects 
700 1 |a Krupnick, Alan 
700 1 |a Matheson, Thornton 
700 1 |a Mullins, Peter 
041 0 7 |a eng  |2 ISO 639-2 
989 |b IMF  |a International Monetary Fund 
490 0 |a IMF Working Papers 
028 5 0 |a 10.5089/9781484328491.001 
856 4 0 |u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2017/254/001.2017.issue-254-en.xml?cid=45410-com-dsp-marc  |x Verlag  |3 Volltext 
082 0 |a 330 
520 |a This paper suggests that the environmental and commercial features of shale gas extraction do not warrant a significantly different fiscal regime than recommended for conventional gas. Fiscal policies may have a role in addressing some environmental risks (e.g., greenhouse gases, scarce water, local air pollution) though in some cases their net benefits may be modest. Simulation analyses suggest, moreover, that special fiscal regimes are generally less important than other factors in determining shale gas investments (hence there appears little need for them), yet they forego significant revenues