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180614 ||| eng |
| 020 |
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|a 9781498351638
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| 100 |
1 |
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|a Behar, Alberto
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| 245 |
0 |
0 |
|a An Analysis of OPEC's Strategic Actions, US Shale Growth and the 2014 Oil Price Crash
|c Alberto Behar, Robert Ritz
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2016
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| 300 |
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|a 36 pages
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| 651 |
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4 |
|a United States
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| 653 |
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|a Public expenditure review
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| 653 |
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|a Oil
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| 653 |
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|a Institutional Investors
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| 653 |
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|a Macroeconomics: Consumption
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| 653 |
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|a Agriculture: Aggregate Supply and Demand Analysis
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| 653 |
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|a Monopoly
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| 653 |
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|a Pension Funds
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| 653 |
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|a Public Finance
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| 653 |
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|a Derivative securities
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| 653 |
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|a Expenditure
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| 653 |
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|a Public finance & taxation
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| 653 |
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|a Oil production
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| 653 |
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|a Economic Theory
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| 653 |
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|a Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Hydrocarbon Fuels
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| 653 |
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|a Monopolization Strategies
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| 653 |
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|a National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General
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| 653 |
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|a Petroleum, oil & gas industries
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| 653 |
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|a Energy: General
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| 653 |
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|a Oil consumption
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| 653 |
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|a Saving
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| 653 |
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|a Petroleum industry and trade
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| 653 |
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|a Non-bank Financial Institutions
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| 653 |
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|a Wealth
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| 653 |
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|a Oil prices
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| 653 |
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|a Consumption
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| 653 |
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|a Economic theory & philosophy
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| 653 |
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|a Prices
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| 653 |
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|a Investments: Energy
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| 653 |
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|a Macroeconomics
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| 653 |
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|a Production
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| 653 |
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|a Economic theory
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| 653 |
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|a Financial Instruments
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| 653 |
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|a Macroeconomics: Production
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| 653 |
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|a Demand elasticity
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| 653 |
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|a Elasticity
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| 653 |
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|a Expenditures, Public
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| 653 |
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|a Industries: Energy
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| 653 |
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|a Investments: Futures
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| 653 |
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|a Finance
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| 653 |
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|a Economics
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| 653 |
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|a Commodities
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| 653 |
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|a Energy: Demand and Supply
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| 653 |
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|a Futures
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| 653 |
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|a Financial institutions
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| 653 |
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|a National accounts
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| 653 |
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|a Investment & securities
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Ritz, Robert
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| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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| 490 |
0 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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| 028 |
5 |
0 |
|a 10.5089/9781498351638.001
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| 856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2016/131/001.2016.issue-131-en.xml?cid=44064-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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| 082 |
0 |
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|a 330
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| 520 |
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|a In November 2014, OPEC announced a new strategy geared towards improving its market share. Oil-market analysts interpreted this as an attempt to squeeze higher-cost producers including US shale oil out of the market. Over the next year, crude oil prices crashed, with large repercussions for the global economy. We present a simple equilibrium model that explains the fundamental market factors that can rationalize such a "regime switch" by OPEC. These include: (i) the growth of US shale oil production; (ii) the slowdown of global oil demand; (iii) reduced cohesiveness of the OPEC cartel; (iv) production ramp-ups in other non-OPEC countries. We show that these qualitative predictions are broadly consistent with oil market developments during 2014-15. The model is calibrated to oil market data; it predicts accommodation up to 2014 and a market-share strategy thereafter, and explains large oil-price swings as well as realistically high levels of OPEC output
|