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180614 ||| eng |
020 |
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|a 9781475563924
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100 |
1 |
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|a Agarwal, Ruchir
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245 |
0 |
0 |
|a Strategic Corporate Layoffs
|c Ruchir Agarwal, Julian Kolev
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260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2016
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300 |
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|a 77 pages
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651 |
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4 |
|a United States
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653 |
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|a Labor market
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653 |
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|a Labor economics
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653 |
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|a Macroeconomics
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653 |
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|a Finance: General
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653 |
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|a Value of Firms
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653 |
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|a Labor Economics: General
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653 |
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|a Labor
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653 |
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|a Income economics
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653 |
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|a Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles: General (includes Measurement and Data)
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653 |
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|a Goodwill
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653 |
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|a Business Fluctuations
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653 |
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|a Financial Risk and Risk Management
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653 |
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|a Financial markets
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653 |
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|a Information and Market Efficiency
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653 |
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|a Finance
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653 |
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|a General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)
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653 |
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|a Labor Turnover
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653 |
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|a Labour
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653 |
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|a Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
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653 |
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|a Financing Policy
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653 |
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|a Wages
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653 |
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|a Labor force
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653 |
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|a Layoffs
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653 |
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|a Economic growth
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653 |
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|a Event Studies
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653 |
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|a Stock exchanges
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653 |
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|a Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General
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653 |
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|a Business cycles
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653 |
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|a Vacancies
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653 |
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|a Capital and Ownership Structure
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653 |
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|a Stock markets
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653 |
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|a Cycles
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700 |
1 |
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|a Kolev, Julian
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041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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490 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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028 |
5 |
0 |
|a 10.5089/9781475563924.001
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856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2016/255/001.2016.issue-255-en.xml?cid=44504-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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082 |
0 |
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|a 330
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520 |
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|a Firms in the S&P 500 often announce layoffs within days of one another, despite the fact that the average S&P 500 constituent announces layoffs once every 5 years. By contrast, similarsized privately-held firms do not behave in this way. This paper provides empirical evidence that such clustering behavior is largely due to CEOs managing their reputation in financial markets. To interpret these results we develop a theoretical framework in which managers delay layoffs during good economic states to avoid damaging the markets perception of their ability. The model predicts clustering in the timing of layoff announcements, and illustrates a mechanism through which the cyclicality of firms layoff policies is amplified. Our findings suggest that reputation management is an important driver of layoff policies both at daily frequencies and over the business cycle, and can have significant macroeconomic consequences
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