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150128 ||| eng |
| 020 |
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|a 9781451863260
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| 100 |
1 |
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|a Cohen, Daniel
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| 245 |
0 |
0 |
|a Toward a Lender of First Resort
|c Daniel Cohen, Richard Portes
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2006
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| 300 |
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|a 26 pages
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| 651 |
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4 |
|a Argentina
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| 653 |
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|a Economic & financial crises & disasters
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| 653 |
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|a Public debt
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| 653 |
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|a Public finance & taxation
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| 653 |
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|a Financial crises
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| 653 |
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|a Debt Management
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| 653 |
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|a Debts, Public
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| 653 |
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|a Debt
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| 653 |
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|a Exports and Imports
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| 653 |
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|a International Lending and Debt Problems
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| 653 |
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|a International economics
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| 653 |
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|a Debts, External
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| 653 |
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|a Sovereign Debt
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| 653 |
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|a Debt burden
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| 653 |
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|a Financial Risk Management
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| 653 |
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|a Public Finance
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| 653 |
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|a Debt sustainability analysis
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| 653 |
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|a Debt default
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| 653 |
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|a Financial Crises
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Portes, Richard
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| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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| 490 |
0 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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| 028 |
5 |
0 |
|a 10.5089/9781451863260.001
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| 856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2006/066/001.2006.issue-066-en.xml?cid=18859-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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| 082 |
0 |
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|a 330
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| 520 |
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|a If interest rates (country spreads) rise, debt can rapidly be subject to a snowball effect, which becomes self-fulfilling with regard to the fundamentals themselves. This is a market imperfection, because we cannot be confident that the unaided market will choose the "good" over the "bad" equilibrium. We propose a policy intervention to deal with this structural weakness in the mechanisms of international capital flows. This is based on a simple taxonomy that breaks down the origin of crises into three components: confidence (spreads and currency crisis), fundamentals (real growth rate), and economic policy (primary deficit). Theory then suggests a set of circumstances in which a lender of first resort would be desirable. The policy would seek to short-circuit confidence crises, partly by using IMF support to improve ex ante incentives. Theory also illuminates the potential role of collective action clauses in reducing the risk of self-fulfilling debt crises
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