|
|
|
|
LEADER |
02843nmm a2200613 u 4500 |
001 |
EB000930504 |
003 |
EBX01000000000000000724100 |
005 |
00000000000000.0 |
007 |
cr||||||||||||||||||||| |
008 |
150128 ||| eng |
020 |
|
|
|a 9781451973594
|
100 |
1 |
|
|a Sdralevich, Carlo
|
245 |
0 |
0 |
|a The New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring
|b Setting the Incentives Right
|c Carlo Sdralevich, Biaggio Bossone
|
260 |
|
|
|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2002
|
300 |
|
|
|a 27 pages
|
651 |
|
4 |
|a Brazil
|
653 |
|
|
|a Economic & financial crises & disasters
|
653 |
|
|
|a International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
|
653 |
|
|
|a Finance
|
653 |
|
|
|a Public finance & taxation
|
653 |
|
|
|a Financial crises
|
653 |
|
|
|a Financial sector policy and analysis
|
653 |
|
|
|a Bankruptcy
|
653 |
|
|
|a General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation
|
653 |
|
|
|a Debt Management
|
653 |
|
|
|a Sovereign debt restructuring
|
653 |
|
|
|a Debt
|
653 |
|
|
|a Exports and Imports
|
653 |
|
|
|a Asset and liability management
|
653 |
|
|
|a International Lending and Debt Problems
|
653 |
|
|
|a International economics
|
653 |
|
|
|a External debt
|
653 |
|
|
|a Debts, External
|
653 |
|
|
|a Sovereign Debt
|
653 |
|
|
|a International Financial Markets
|
653 |
|
|
|a Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
|
653 |
|
|
|a Financial risk management
|
653 |
|
|
|a Liquidation
|
653 |
|
|
|a Tax incentives
|
653 |
|
|
|a Debt restructuring
|
653 |
|
|
|a Moral hazard
|
653 |
|
|
|a Taxation
|
653 |
|
|
|a Financial Risk Management
|
653 |
|
|
|a Finance: General
|
653 |
|
|
|a Debt sustainability analysis
|
653 |
|
|
|a Financial Crises
|
700 |
1 |
|
|a Bossone, Biaggio
|
041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
|
989 |
|
|
|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
|
490 |
0 |
|
|a IMF Policy Discussion Papers
|
028 |
5 |
0 |
|a 10.5089/9781451973594.003
|
856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/003/2002/004/003.2002.issue-004-en.xml?cid=15661-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
|
082 |
0 |
|
|a 330
|
520 |
|
|
|a The paper discusses key incentive-related issues of the sovereign debt restructuring mechanism recently outlined by the IMF First Deputy Managing Director. The structure of incentives in the mechanism should be consistent with the principle of favoring market-oriented, voluntary solutions to financial crises. The paper frames the mechanism in the context of involving the private sector in financial crisis resolution (PSI), and identifies the conditions for setting up an appropriate incentive structure. The paper explores issues relating to the functioning of the mechanism, including access policy on IMF resources; the power to activate the mechanism; its relation with intermediate PSI instruments; and its impact on investment in emerging markets
|