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150128 ||| eng |
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|a 1451862245
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|z 9781451862249
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|a 9781451862249
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1 |
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|a Diks, Cees G.H.
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|a The Role of Domestic and Foreign Investors in a Simple Model of Speculative Attacks
|h electronic resource
|c Cees G.H. Diks
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2005, 2005
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| 300 |
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|a 24 p.
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| 651 |
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4 |
|a Korea, Republic of
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| 653 |
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|a Exchange Rate Regime
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| 653 |
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|a Fixed Exchange Rate
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| 653 |
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|a International Lending and Debt Problems
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| 653 |
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|a Exchange Rate
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| 653 |
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|a Foreign Investors
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| 653 |
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|a Government Guarantees
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Botman, Dennis P.J.
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Diks, Cees G.H.
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| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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| 490 |
0 |
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper
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| 028 |
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|a 10.5089/9781451862249.001
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| 856 |
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|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/07266-9781451862249/07266-9781451862249/07266-9781451862249.xml
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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|a 330
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| 520 |
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|a We introduce local and foreign investors in a simple model of speculative attacks. Local investors have less tolerance for overvaluation of the fixed exchange rate because they tend to incur lower costs when taking a short position and possess better information, and because of moral hazard created by discriminatory government guarantees. On the other hand, the prospect of higher taxation after a balance of payments crisis deters speculation by locals compared to foreign investors. Finally, the lower the degree of exchange rate pass-through, the more likely domestic investors are tp take the lead during capital flight
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