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150128 ||| eng |
| 020 |
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|a 9781451851700
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| 100 |
1 |
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|a Sy, Amadou
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| 245 |
0 |
0 |
|a Managerial Entrenchment and the Choice of Debt Financing
|c Amadou Sy
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 1999
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| 300 |
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|a 29 pages
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| 653 |
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|a Financial services law & regulation
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| 653 |
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|a Depository Institutions
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| 653 |
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|a International Lending and Debt Problems
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| 653 |
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|a Financial Risk Management
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| 653 |
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|a Micro Finance Institutions
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| 653 |
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|a Banks and Banking
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| 653 |
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|a Credit risk
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| 653 |
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|a Macroeconomics
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| 653 |
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|a Institutional Investors
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| 653 |
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|a Public Finance
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| 653 |
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|a Sovereign Debt
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| 653 |
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|a Debts, Public
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| 653 |
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|a Financial Instruments
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| 653 |
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|a Finance
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| 653 |
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|a Debt
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| 653 |
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|a Debt renegotiation
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| 653 |
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|a Pension Funds
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| 653 |
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|a Debt Management
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| 653 |
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|a Exports and Imports
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| 653 |
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|a Goodwill
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| 653 |
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|a Public finance & taxation
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| 653 |
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|a Financing Policy
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| 653 |
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|a Debt financing
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| 653 |
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|a Public debt
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| 653 |
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|a Value of Firms
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| 653 |
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|a Debts, External
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| 653 |
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|a Financial Risk and Risk Management
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| 653 |
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|a Capital and Ownership Structure
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| 653 |
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|a Banks
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| 653 |
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|a International economics
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| 653 |
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|a Private debt
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| 653 |
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|a Mortgages
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| 653 |
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|a Non-bank Financial Institutions
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| 653 |
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|a Financial risk management
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| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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| 490 |
0 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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| 856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1999/094/001.1999.issue-094-en.xml?cid=3155-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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| 082 |
0 |
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|a 330
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| 520 |
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|a The paper analyzes the choice between public and private debt by an entrenched manager. The model shows that when the firm’s credit risk is low, management issues public bonds because of the value gains from increased flexibility rather than reduced restrictions and monitoring. In fact, management’s expected private gains decrease as initial private debt restrictions are selectively relaxed. In contrast, when credit risk is high, management issues private debt because of the value gains and private benefits from renegotiating more stringent restrictions. When the maturity of private debt is shortened, however, privately and publicly placed bonds can be preferred to bank debt
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