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150128 ||| eng |
| 020 |
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|a 9781451851700
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| 100 |
1 |
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|a Sy, Amadou
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| 245 |
0 |
0 |
|a Managerial Entrenchment and the Choice of Debt Financing
|c Amadou Sy
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 1999
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| 300 |
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|a 29 pages
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| 653 |
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|a Finance
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| 653 |
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|a Public Finance
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| 653 |
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|a Financial Instruments
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| 653 |
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|a Public debt
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| 653 |
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|a Public finance & taxation
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| 653 |
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|a Non-bank Financial Institutions
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| 653 |
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|a Macroeconomics
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| 653 |
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|a Debt Management
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| 653 |
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|a Financial Risk and Risk Management
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| 653 |
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|a Debt financing
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| 653 |
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|a Exports and Imports
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| 653 |
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|a Micro Finance Institutions
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| 653 |
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|a Institutional Investors
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| 653 |
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|a Depository Institutions
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| 653 |
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|a Financial risk management
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| 653 |
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|a Credit risk
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| 653 |
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|a Banks
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| 653 |
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|a Financial services law & regulation
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| 653 |
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|a Pension Funds
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| 653 |
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|a Debts, External
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| 653 |
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|a Financing Policy
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| 653 |
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|a Debt
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| 653 |
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|a International Lending and Debt Problems
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| 653 |
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|a Private debt
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| 653 |
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|a Debts, Public
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| 653 |
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|a Mortgages
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| 653 |
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|a Value of Firms
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| 653 |
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|a Capital and Ownership Structure
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| 653 |
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|a Sovereign Debt
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| 653 |
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|a International economics
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| 653 |
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|a Goodwill
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| 653 |
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|a Banks and Banking
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| 653 |
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|a Debt renegotiation
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| 653 |
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|a Financial Risk Management
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| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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| 490 |
0 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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| 856 |
4 |
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|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1999/094/001.1999.issue-094-en.xml?cid=3155-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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| 082 |
0 |
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|a 330
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| 520 |
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|a The paper analyzes the choice between public and private debt by an entrenched manager. The model shows that when the firm’s credit risk is low, management issues public bonds because of the value gains from increased flexibility rather than reduced restrictions and monitoring. In fact, management’s expected private gains decrease as initial private debt restrictions are selectively relaxed. In contrast, when credit risk is high, management issues private debt because of the value gains and private benefits from renegotiating more stringent restrictions. When the maturity of private debt is shortened, however, privately and publicly placed bonds can be preferred to bank debt
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