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150128 ||| eng |
| 020 |
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|a 9781451863833
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| 100 |
1 |
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|a Mody, Ashoka
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| 245 |
0 |
0 |
|a Can Budget Institutions Counteract Political Indiscipline?
|c Ashoka Mody, Stefania Fabrizio
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2006
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| 300 |
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|a 53 pages
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| 651 |
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4 |
|a Poland, Republic of
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| 653 |
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|a Fiscal stance
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| 653 |
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|a Public debt
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| 653 |
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|a Labour
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| 653 |
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|a Budget Systems
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| 653 |
|
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|a Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
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| 653 |
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|a Public finance & taxation
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| 653 |
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|a Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
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| 653 |
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|a Debt Management
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| 653 |
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|a Fiscal Policy
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| 653 |
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|a Debts, Public
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| 653 |
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|a Debt
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| 653 |
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|a Unemployment
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| 653 |
|
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|a Budget planning and preparation
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| 653 |
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|a Fiscal policy
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| 653 |
|
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|a Budgeting
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| 653 |
|
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|a National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General
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| 653 |
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|a Labor
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| 653 |
|
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|a Sovereign Debt
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| 653 |
|
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|a Expenditure
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| 653 |
|
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|a Expenditures, Public
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| 653 |
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|a Budget
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| 653 |
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|a Macroeconomics
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| 653 |
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|a Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook: General
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| 653 |
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|a Public financial management (PFM)
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| 653 |
|
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|a Unemployment rate
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| 653 |
|
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|a National Budget
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| 653 |
|
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|a Budgeting & financial management
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| 653 |
|
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|a National Budget, Deficit, and Debt: General
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| 653 |
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|a Public Finance
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| 653 |
|
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|a Income economics
|
| 700 |
1 |
|
|a Fabrizio, Stefania
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| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
|
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
|
| 490 |
0 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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| 028 |
5 |
0 |
|a 10.5089/9781451863833.001
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| 856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2006/123/001.2006.issue-123-en.xml?cid=19141-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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| 082 |
0 |
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|a 330
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| 520 |
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|a The budget is an expression of political rather than economic priorities. We confirm this proposition for a group of new and potential members of the European Union, finding that politics dominates. The contemporary practice of democracy can increase budget deficits through not only ideological preferences but also more fragmented government coalitions and higher voter participation. Long-term structural forces, triggered by societal divisions and representative electoral rules, have more ambiguous implications but also appear to increase budget pressures, as others have also found. However, our most robust, and hopeful, finding is that budget institutions-mechanisms and rules of the budget process-that create checks and balances have significant value even when the politics is representative but undisciplined, and when long-term structural forces are unfavorable
|