To "B" or Not to "B" A Welfare Analysis of Breaking Up Monopolies in an Endogenous Growth Model
This paper studies the welfare consequences of a government regulation that forces a patented equipment to be supplied by a number of independent producers. On the one hand, such a regulation hurts the value of a patent and therefore reduces activities in the R&D sector. On the other hand, the e...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Washington, D.C.
International Monetary Fund
2000
|
| Series: | IMF Working Papers
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
| Collection: | International Monetary Fund - Collection details see MPG.ReNa |
| Summary: | This paper studies the welfare consequences of a government regulation that forces a patented equipment to be supplied by a number of independent producers. On the one hand, such a regulation hurts the value of a patent and therefore reduces activities in the R&D sector. On the other hand, the enhanced competition for the equipment improves efficiency in the manufacturing sector. Should monopolies protected by intellectual property rights be broken up? The answer is “no” in a Romer-type growth model, but there is sufficient reason to believe that the answer could be “yes” in a model advocated by Jones (1995) |
|---|---|
| Physical Description: | 18 pages |
| ISBN: | 9781451859607 |