Electoral System and Public Spending

We study the effects of electoral institutions on the size and composition of public expenditure in OECD and Latin American countries. We present a model emphasizing the distinction between purchases of goods and services, which are easier to target geographically, and transfers, which are easier to...

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Main Author: Perotti, Roberto
Other Authors: Milesi-Ferretti, Gian, Rostagno, Massimo V.
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Washington, D.C. International Monetary Fund 2001, 2001
Series:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper
Subjects:
Online Access:
Collection: International Monetary Fund - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
Summary:We study the effects of electoral institutions on the size and composition of public expenditure in OECD and Latin American countries. We present a model emphasizing the distinction between purchases of goods and services, which are easier to target geographically, and transfers, which are easier to target across social groups. Voters have an incentive to elect representatives more prone to transfer spending in proportional systems. The model also predicts higher primary spending in proportional systems when the share of transfer spending is high. After defining rigorous measures of proportionality, we find considerable empirical support for our predictions
Physical Description:44 p.
ISBN:9781451843972
1451843976