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150128 ||| eng |
| 020 |
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|a 9781451855005
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| 100 |
1 |
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|a Kim, Yungsan
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| 245 |
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0 |
|a Trade Credit and the Effect of Macro-Financial Shocks
|b Evidence From U.S. Panel Data
|c Yungsan Kim, Woon Choi
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2003
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| 300 |
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|a 34 pages
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| 651 |
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4 |
|a United States
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| 653 |
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|a Finance, Public
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| 653 |
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|a Credit
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| 653 |
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|a Finance
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| 653 |
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|a Public finance & taxation
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| 653 |
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|a Monetary tightening
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| 653 |
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|a Government asset management
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| 653 |
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|a Governmental Property
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| 653 |
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|a Exports and Imports
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| 653 |
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|a Spatio-temporal Models
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| 653 |
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|a International Lending and Debt Problems
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| 653 |
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|a External debt
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| 653 |
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|a Money
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| 653 |
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|a Labor
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| 653 |
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|a International Financial Markets
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| 653 |
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|a Asset-liability management
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| 653 |
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|a Bank credit
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| 653 |
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|a Public financial management (PFM)
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| 653 |
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|a Financial Risk Management
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| 653 |
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|a Income economics
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| 653 |
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|a Labour
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| 653 |
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|a Monetary economics
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| 653 |
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|a Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General
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| 653 |
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|a Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General
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| 653 |
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|a Asset and liability management
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| 653 |
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|a International economics
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| 653 |
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|a Debts, External
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| 653 |
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|a Asset management
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| 653 |
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|a Panel Data Models
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| 653 |
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|a Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
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| 653 |
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|a Monetary policy
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| 653 |
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|a Wages
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| 653 |
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|a Monetary Policy
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| 653 |
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|a Public Finance
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| 653 |
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|a Money and Monetary Policy
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| 653 |
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|a Trade credits
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Choi, Woon
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| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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| 490 |
0 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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| 028 |
5 |
0 |
|a 10.5089/9781451855005.001
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| 856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2003/127/001.2003.issue-127-en.xml?cid=16563-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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| 082 |
0 |
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|a 330
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| 520 |
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|a Many studies examine why firms are financed by their suppliers, but few empirical studies look at the macroeconomic implications of such financial arrangements. Using disaggregated panel data, we examine how firms extend and use trade credit. We find that, controlling for the transactions or asset management motive, both accounts payable and receivable increase with tighter policy, implying that trade credit helps firms absorb the effect of a credit contraction. A comparison of S&P 500 firms with smaller firms, however, provides no evidence that when policy is tightened, large firms play the role of credit suppliers more actively than small firms
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