A Political-Economic Model of the Choice of Exchange Rate Regime
Facing electoral uncertainty, a government chooses its exchange regime in a trade-off among three incentives: (i) tying the hands of its opponent should it lose the election; (ii) facilitating its own future policy implementation should it win the election; and (iii) increasing its chance of reelect...
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
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Washington, D.C.
International Monetary Fund
2002
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| Series: | IMF Working Papers
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| Collection: | International Monetary Fund - Collection details see MPG.ReNa |
| Summary: | Facing electoral uncertainty, a government chooses its exchange regime in a trade-off among three incentives: (i) tying the hands of its opponent should it lose the election; (ii) facilitating its own future policy implementation should it win the election; and (iii) increasing its chance of reelection |
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| Physical Description: | 19 pages |
| ISBN: | 9781451874907 |