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150128 ||| eng |
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|a 9781451850482
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|a Agénor, Pierre-Richard
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|a Credibility Effects of Price Controls in Disinflation Programs
|c Pierre-Richard Agénor
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 1992
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| 300 |
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|a 23 pages
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| 651 |
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4 |
|a Argentina
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| 653 |
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|a Tax policy
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| 653 |
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|a Macroeconomics
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| 653 |
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|a Optimal taxation
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| 653 |
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|a Economic theory
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| 653 |
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|a Deflation
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| 653 |
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|a Economics
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| 653 |
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|a Prices
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| 653 |
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|a Public finance & taxation
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| 653 |
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|a Economic Theory
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| 653 |
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|a Price controls
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| 653 |
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|a Optimal Taxation
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| 653 |
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|a Inflation
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| 653 |
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|a Elasticity
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| 653 |
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|a Asset prices
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| 653 |
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|a Economic theory & philosophy
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| 653 |
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|a Noncooperative Games
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| 653 |
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|a Taxation
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| 653 |
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|a Demand elasticity
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| 653 |
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|a Incomes Policy
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| 653 |
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|a Price Level
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| 653 |
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|a Efficiency
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| 653 |
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|a Agriculture: Aggregate Supply and Demand Analysis
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| 653 |
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|a Tax administration and procedure
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| 653 |
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|a Price Policy
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| 653 |
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|a Government policy
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| 041 |
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|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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| 490 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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| 028 |
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|a 10.5089/9781451850482.001
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| 856 |
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|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1992/083/001.1992.issue-083-en.xml?cid=833-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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|a 330
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| 520 |
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|a This paper examines whether price controls may enhance the credibility of a disinflation program, using a framework in which agents behave strategically. The analysis indicates that a partial price freeze is not fully credible, and may result in inflation inertia. The authorities may be able to determine optimally the intensity of price controls so as to minimize the policy loss associated with a discretionary monetary strategy. But the optimal intensity of controls is shown to be significantly different from zero only if the cost of enforcing price ceilings is not too high, or if the weight attached to price distortions in the policymaker’s loss function is small
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