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150128 ||| eng |
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|a 9781463924645
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| 100 |
1 |
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|a Zettelmeyer, Jeromin
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| 245 |
0 |
0 |
|a The Problem that Wasn't
|b Coordination Failures in Sovereign Debt Restructurings
|c Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Marcos Chamon, Ran Bi
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2011
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| 300 |
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|a 28 pages
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| 651 |
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4 |
|a Argentina
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| 653 |
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|a Economic & financial crises & disasters
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| 653 |
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|a International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
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| 653 |
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|a International Organizations
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| 653 |
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|a Finance
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| 653 |
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|a Financial crises
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| 653 |
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|a Financial institutions
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| 653 |
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|a Debt Management
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| 653 |
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|a Sovereign debt restructuring
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| 653 |
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|a Debt
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| 653 |
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|a General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)
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| 653 |
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|a Investments: Bonds
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| 653 |
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|a Asset and liability management
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| 653 |
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|a International Lending and Debt Problems
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| 653 |
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|a Debts, External
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| 653 |
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|a Sovereign Debt
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| 653 |
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|a Collective action clauses
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| 653 |
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|a Bonds
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| 653 |
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|a International Law
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| 653 |
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|a Debt restructuring
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| 653 |
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|a Investment & securities
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| 653 |
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|a Financial Risk Management
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| 653 |
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|a International Agreements and Observance
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| 653 |
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|a Financial Crises
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Bi, Ran
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Chamon, Marcos
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| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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| 490 |
0 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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| 028 |
5 |
0 |
|a 10.5089/9781463924645.001
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| 856 |
4 |
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|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2011/265/001.2011.issue-265-en.xml?cid=25358-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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| 082 |
0 |
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|a 330
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| 520 |
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|a Contrary to widespread expectation, debt renegotiations in the era of bond finance have generally been quick and involved little litigation. We present a model that rationalizes the initial fears and offers interpretations for why they did not materialize. When the exchange offer is sufficiently attractive vis-à-vis holding out, full participation can be an equilibrium. Legal innovations such as minimum participation thresholds and defensive exit consents helped coordinate creditors and avoid litigation. Unlike CACs, exit consents can be exploited to force high haircuts on creditors, but the ability of creditors to coordinate to block exit consents can limit overly aggressive use
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