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150128 ||| eng |
| 020 |
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|a 9781451950694
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| 245 |
0 |
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|a Endogeneity in Structural Unemployment Equations
|b The Case of Canada
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 1993
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| 300 |
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|a 30 pages
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| 651 |
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4 |
|a Canada
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| 653 |
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|a Policy Designs and Consistency
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| 653 |
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|a Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
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| 653 |
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|a Employment
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| 653 |
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|a Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining: General
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| 653 |
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|a Labor
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| 653 |
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|a Labor unions
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| 653 |
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|a Aggregate Human Capital
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| 653 |
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|a Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General
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| 653 |
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|a Policy Coordination
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| 653 |
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|a Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits
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| 653 |
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|a Private Pensions
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| 653 |
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|a Severance Pay
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| 653 |
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|a Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: Public Policy
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| 653 |
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|a Aggregate Labor Productivity
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| 653 |
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|a Intergenerational Income Distribution
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| 653 |
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|a Unemployment rate
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| 653 |
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|a Labour
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| 653 |
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|a Unemployment
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| 653 |
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|a Labor costs
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| 653 |
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|a Plant Closings
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| 653 |
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|a Trade unions
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| 653 |
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|a Unemployment Insurance
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| 653 |
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|a Income economics
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| 653 |
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|a Policy Objectives
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| 653 |
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|a Minimum wage
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| 653 |
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|a Wages
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| 653 |
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|a Minimum wages
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| 710 |
2 |
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|a International Monetary Fund
|
| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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| 490 |
0 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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| 856 |
4 |
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|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1993/094/001.1993.issue-094-en.xml?cid=876-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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| 082 |
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|a 330
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| 520 |
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|a This paper examines the endogeneity of several structural variables which enter unemployment rate equations—the generosity of unemployment benefits, nonwage labor costs, the relative minimum wage, and the degree of unionization. It finds evidence of reverse causality for these structural variables based on causality tests. The structural unemployment rate equation is then estimated using instruments suggested by the empirical analysis of the structural variables. The paper confirms the earlier finding that the generosity of unemployment benefits, nonwage labor costs, and the relative minimum wage have a significant positive impact on the unemployment rate, but fails to find an effect for the degree of unionization
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