Epistemological disjunctivism

Duncan Pritchard offers an account of perceptual knowledge arguing that it is paradigmatically constituted by true belief that enjoys rational support which is reflectively accessible to the agent. This resolves the issue between intermalism and externalism, and poses a radical challenge to contempo...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Pritchard, Duncan
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Oxford Oxford University Press 2012, 2012
Subjects:
Online Access:
Collection: Oxford University Press - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
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