Against absolute goodness

Are there things we should value because they are, quite simply good? Richard Kraut argues that there are not. Goodness, he holds, is not a reason-giving property - in fact, there may be no such thing. It is an illusory and insidious category of practical thought

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Kraut, Richard
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: New York Oxford University Press 2011, 2011
Subjects:
Online Access:
Collection: Oxford University Press - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
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