Firms, contracts, and financial structure
This book provides a framework for thinking about economic relationships and institutions such as firms. The basic argument is that in a world of incomplete contracts, institutional arrangements are designed to allocate power among agents
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
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Oxford
Clarendon
1995, 1995
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| Series: | Clarendon lectures in economics / Clarendon lectures in economics
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| Subjects: | |
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| Collection: | Oxford University Press - Collection details see MPG.ReNa |
| Summary: | This book provides a framework for thinking about economic relationships and institutions such as firms. The basic argument is that in a world of incomplete contracts, institutional arrangements are designed to allocate power among agents |
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| Physical Description: | viii, 228 p. ill |
| ISBN: | 9780191596353 |