A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation

Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Ray, Debraj
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Oxford Oxford University Press 2007, 2007
Series:Lipsey Lectures series / Lipsey Lectures series
Subjects:
Online Access:
Collection: Oxford University Press - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
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