Knowledge, Cause, and Abstract Objects Causal Objections to Platonism

According to platonists, entities such as numbers, sets, propositions and properties are abstract objects. But abstract objects lack causal powers and a location in space and time, so how could we ever come to know of the existence of such impotent and remote objects? In Knowledge, Cause, and Abstra...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Cheyne, C.
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 2001, 2001
Edition:1st ed. 2001
Series:The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, A Series of Books in Philosophy of Science, Methodology, Epistemology, Logic, History of Science, and Related Fields
Subjects:
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Collection: Springer Book Archives -2004 - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
Table of Contents:
  • 1. Platonism and Causality
  • 2. Beliefs and Facts
  • 3. Beliefs and Causes
  • 4. The Case for a Causal Connection
  • 5. Is a Causal Connection Necessary for Knowledge?
  • 6. Other Theories of Knowledge
  • 7. Existence Claims and Causality
  • 8. The Burden of Proof
  • 9. Platonic Knowledge by Intuition
  • 10. Apriorism
  • 11. Indispensability and Platonic Knowledge
  • 12. Problems with Prolifigate Platonism
  • Conclusion
  • Appendices
  • I. Does Knowledge Require Belief?
  • 1.1. The traditional analysis of knowledge
  • 1.2. The truth condition
  • 1.3. The consistency of belief and knowledge
  • 1.4. Radford’s counterexample
  • 1.5. Information and knowledge
  • II. Can We Choose Our Beliefs?
  • II. 1. Belief-voluntarism and epistemic justification
  • 11.2. Belief-voluntarism — is it possible?
  • 11.3. Direct belief-voluntarism — is it actual?
  • 11.4. Belief and acceptance
  • 11.5. Choosing beliefs indirectly