Nomic Inference An Introduction to the Logic of Scientific Inquiry

Those who speak of the philosophy of science do not all have the same sort of study in mind. For some it is speculation about the overall nature of the world. Others take it to be basic theory of knowledge and perception. And for still others, it is a branch of philosophical analysis focused speci­...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Cannavo, Salvator
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 1974, 1974
Edition:1st ed. 1974
Subjects:
Online Access:
Collection: Springer Book Archives -2004 - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
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505 0 |a I. Analytical Philosophy of Science -- A. What is the Philosophy of Science? -- B. Methods of Analytical Philosophy -- C. Methods of Analytical Philosophy of Science -- D. The Analytical Account of Science -- E. Philosophical Analysis of Science and a Theory of Science -- II. What Science is: An Introductory Consideration -- A. Science and Non-Science -- B. Science and Common Sense -- C. Some Distinguishing Features of Science -- D. Distinctive Aspects of Control on Scientific Inferences -- E. Empiricist Background and Significance -- III. Ampliative Science -- (I) Discovery -- (II) Acceptance -- IV. Subsumptive Science A. Systemization -- A Broad Distinction: Ampliative and Subsumptive Inference -- B. Nomic Inferences: Introductory Background -- C. Nomic Inferences with Singular Conclusions -- D. Explanation, a Species of Nomic Inference -- E. A Detour: The Causal Relation -- F. Back to Explanation Again -- G. Patterns of Nomic Inference -- H. Summary -- V. Other Aspects of Nomic Inference -- A. Are There non-Nomic Explanations? -- B. Functional (Teleological) Accounts -- C. Derivations: Nomic Inferences with Nomic Conclusions -- D. Probabilistic Nomic Inference -- E. Summary -- VI. Nomic Statements (I): Scientific Laws -- A. Introduction: Necessary Truth, Logic and Factual Science -- B. Universal Laws -- C. Statistical Laws -- D. Summary -- VII. Nomic Statements (II): Theories, Models, Analogy -- A. Theory and Observational Laws -- B. The Formal Structuring of Theories -- C. Models -- D. Formalization and Scientific Theory -- E. Analogical Content in Theories -- F. Recapitulation: What is a Scientific Theory? -- VIII. Glimpses Beyond -- A. Overview -- B. Conventionalistic Trends -- C. Incommensurability; Non-reduction and Non-accumulation of Scientific Knowledge -- D. Non-methodism -- E. The History and Philosophyof Science 
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520 |a Those who speak of the philosophy of science do not all have the same sort of study in mind. For some it is speculation about the overall nature of the world. Others take it to be basic theory of knowledge and perception. And for still others, it is a branch of philosophical analysis focused speci­ is meant to be a study falling under fically on science. The present book this last category. Generally, such a study has two aspects: one, methodological, dealing with the logical structure of science, the other, substantive, dealing with scientific concepts. Our concern here is primarily methodological; and, where discussion veers at times towards substantive matters, this will be largely for the purpose of illustrating underlying methodological points. It should also be added that our considerations will be of a general sort, intended to apply to all of science with no special concern for any particular divisions. Except in an incidental manner, therefore, we shall give no primary attention to special problems in the methodology of the social sciences or in the philosophy of physics or of biology. And if we draw the larger portion of our examples from the physical rather than from the behavioral sciences, this is done merely for simplicity, succinctness, and similar conveniences of exposition rather than out of specialized concern for any particular area