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140122 ||| eng |
| 020 |
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|a 9789401012683
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| 100 |
1 |
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|a Pörn, I.
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| 245 |
0 |
0 |
|a Action Theory and Social Science
|h Elektronische Ressource
|b Some Formal Models
|c by I. Pörn
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| 250 |
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|a 1st ed. 1977
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| 260 |
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|a Dordrecht
|b Springer Netherlands
|c 1977, 1977
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| 300 |
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|a X, 138 p
|b online resource
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| 505 |
0 |
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|a 53. Meaning and Understanding -- 54. Essential Explanations -- 55. Counterfactuals and Causal Explanations -- 56. Counterfactuals and Explanation of Actions -- 57. Functional Explanation -- 58. Laws and Explanation of Actions -- 59. Free Will and the Validity of Laws -- 60. Agents
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| 505 |
0 |
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|a 1. Action Modalities -- 1. Some Remarks on the Language L -- 2. On the Semantics of a First-Order Language -- 3. The Semantics for L -- 4. Necessity for something that an Agent does -- 5. Counteraction Conditionality -- 6. Some Defined Action Concepts -- 7. On the Logic of L -- 8. Act Relations -- 9. Act Relations and N-Equality -- 10. Consequences of Action -- 2. Intentions and Reasons -- 11. Belief -- 12. Norms and Normative Positions -- 13. Singular Norms and Intentions to do -- 14. Sets and Systems of Norms -- 15. Intentional Action -- 16. Transmission of Intention -- 17. Acting with a Further Intention -- 18. Reasons for Action and Wants -- 19. Valuations and Value Positions -- 20. Attitudes -- 3. Activities and Proceedings -- 21. Action Complexes -- 22. Structure of Activities: Two Examples -- 23. Finite Automata -- 24. Transmission of Agency -- 25. Determinism and Agency -- 26. Intervention in Norm-Governed Worlds -- 27. Grammars -- 28. Organizations --
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| 505 |
0 |
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|a 29. L-Grammars and L-Organizations -- 30. Role Structures -- 4. Control, Influence and Interaction -- 31. Control in Relation to an Agent -- 32. On the Power to Act -- 33. Influence and Social Power -- 34. On the Measurement of Influence -- 35. Control over an Agent -- 36. On Communication and Control -- 37. Action in Consequence Relations -- 38. Interaction -- 39. Social Groups and Social Systems -- 40. The Basis of Social Order -- 5. Social Dynamics -- 41. Information-Feedback Control: An Example -- 42. Elementary Information-Feedback Control Loops -- 43. A Dynamic System Model -- 44. Application of the Model to N-Agent Actions -- 45. Elementary Dynamics -- 46. Two-Agent Dynamic Action -- 47. Interdependent Decision -- 48. Interdependent Decision: Metagames -- 49. Metagames and Incomplete Information -- 50. Teleological Systems -- 6. Action-Explanations -- 51. Understanding and Knowledge of Facts -- 52. Understanding and Knowledge of Intentions and Actions --
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| 653 |
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|a Philosophy of the Social Sciences
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| 653 |
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|a Philosophy and social sciences
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| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b SBA
|a Springer Book Archives -2004
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| 490 |
0 |
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|a Synthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science
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| 028 |
5 |
0 |
|a 10.1007/978-94-010-1268-3
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| 856 |
4 |
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|u https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1268-3?nosfx=y
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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| 082 |
0 |
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|a 300.1
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| 520 |
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|a This book is intended as a contribution to the foundations of the sciences of man, especially the social sciences. It has been argued with increasing frequency in recent years that the vocabulary of social science is to a large extent an action vocabulary and that any attempt to systematize concepts and establish bases for understanding in the field cannot, therefore, succeed unless it is firmly built on action theory. I think that these claims are sub stantially correct, but at the same time it seems to me that action theory, as it is relevant to social science, still awaits vital contributions from logic and philosophy. For example, it has often been said, rightly I believe, that situa tions in which two or more agents interact constitute the subject-matter of social science. But have we got an action theory which is rich enough or com prehensive enough to allow us to characterize the interaction situation? I think not. Once we have such a theory, however, we should be able to give an accurate account of central social phenomena and to articulate our concep tions about the nature of social reality. The conceptual scheme advanced in this book consists, in the first instance, of solutions to a number of characterization problems, i. e. problems which may be expressed by questions of the form "What is the nature of . .
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