The Value of Signals in Hidden Action Models Concepts, Application, and Empirical Evidence
What happens if A wants to buy a good or service from B, but not all relevant characteristics can be fixed in a contract? This book gives a non-technical overview of various models dealing with this situation. Particular emphasis is put on the problem that the service includes various tasks and B is...
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
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Heidelberg
Physica
2004, 2004
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| Edition: | 1st ed. 2004 |
| Series: | Contributions to Economics
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
| Collection: | Springer Book Archives -2004 - Collection details see MPG.ReNa |
Table of Contents:
- Effort Misallocation and the Value of Signals
- 2.1 Problems of Non-contractibility
- 2.2 Decomposing Agency Costs
- 2.3 Relationship between Misallocation and Uncertainty
- 2.4 Summary
- Firm Performance Measures
- 3.1 Multiple Agents and Free-Riding
- 3.2 The Use of Benefit Signals
- 3.3 Implications and Implementation
- 3.4 Summary
- Statistical Model and Empirical Evidence
- 4.1 Empirical Studies of the Value of Signals
- 4.2 The ECMOSS Data Set
- 4.3 Estimation Under Multivariate Censoring
- 4.4 Results
- 4.5 Summary
- Conclusion
- A Properties of the Multivariate Censoring Estimator
- B Stata Programme
- B Stata Programme
- C Tables
- References
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- List of Symbols